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1.1 Preliminary issues and research question 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (the CRC)1 is the guiding legal 
framework for the development and implementation of legislation and policies concerning 
the human rights of children and it has had an evident impact on international human rights 
jurisprudence.2 The CRC has reached almost universal ratification as at the time of writing 
there are 196 State Parties to the CRC, making it the most widely ratified agreement ever.3 
Generally, the aim of the CRC is to protect all children everywhere under the age of 18 and 
to recognize every child as an individual holder of human rights and fundamental freedoms.4 
The CRC introduced 40 distinct rights for children, some of which were already recognized 
to some extent in the League of Nations 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
and in the United Nations 1959 Declaration for the Rights of the Child.5  The general 
purposes of the rights conferred to children in the CRC have been described as the “4 P’s”, 
namely prevention, protection, provision and participation.6 The Convention endeavours to 
prevention of harm to children, protection of children against discrimination, neglect and 
exploitation, provision of assistance for children’s basic needs and participation of children 
in decisions affecting them.7 
In addition, the CRC established and partially reaffirmed two principles of interpretation in 
international law, namely the evolving capacities of the child and the principle of the best 
interests of the child.8 The focus of this thesis is on the latter. The principle draws its content 
 
1 Adopted 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, UNTS 1577. 
2 See e.g. Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek, ‘Litigating the Rights of the Child: Taking Stock After 25 Years of 
the CRC’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). 
3 The only state that has not ratified the CRC is the United States.  
4 According to Article 1 of the CRC, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. For more about the universality and effects on 
international law in general, see e.g. Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (2nd edition, CUP 
2014), p. 67, John Wall, ‘Human Rights in Light of Childhood’ (2008) 16 Int’l J Child Rts 523 and Rebeca 
Rios-Kohn, ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges’ (1998) 5 Geo J on Fighting 
Poverty 139. 
5 However, the CRC widened the scope of the rights recognized in these earlier declarations and it contains 18 
“new” rights. For more detailed comparison, see John Wall, ‘Human Rights in Light of Childhood’ (2008) 
16 Int’l J Child Rts 523.  
6 See e.g. Stephen Michael Cretney and Judith M. Masson, Principles of Family Law (6th edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell 1997), p. 585.   
7 See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1995), p. 15.  
8 Ibid. p. 45.  
 2 
primarily from Article 3(1) of the CRC according to which the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies. 
The second feature of this thesis is based on the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)9, which was drafted in post-cold war circumstances and in the light of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)10 within the Council of Europe. The ECHR 
entered into force in 1953. All 47 Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified the 
Convention and it is now a political obligation of membership to the Council to become a 
party to the ECHR.11 Thus, it probably is understood that both of the just mentioned treaties 
bind all the CoE Member States. What makes the ECHR distinct from other human rights 
conventions, such as the CRC, are the strong enforcement mechanisms it provides, namely 
individual and state applications. Both of these applications go to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) which is a permanent court composed of full-time judges.12 
The ECHR was partly a reaction to serious human rights violations that occurred during the 
Second World War and its purpose was to protect civil and political rights, which were 
considered as “essential for a democratic way of life”.13  Obviously, the recognition of 
children’s rights back then was not as enlightened as today, which becomes evident from the 
text of the Convention. The Convention does not confer rights specifically adjusted for 
children nor contain many explicit references to children’s rights14 and certainly not to their 
best interests. However, Article 8 of the ECHR has been recognized for a while to have great 
potential for promoting children’s rights within the CoE jurisprudence since it secures the 
right for everyone to enjoy respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence 
without unjustified state interference. From the potential of Article 8 to be interpreted and 
developed in a way of securing and promoting the rights of the child, I have drawn my 
 
9  Formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entry into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
10 UNGA Res 217 A (III), ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 1948). 
11 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1031 (1994) para 9.  
12 See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, ’The CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), 
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and 
International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). The CoE is Europe’s leading human rights organization. 
13 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), pp. 3–5. 
14Article 5 of the Convention refers to children in relation to the detention of a minor and Article 6 is concerned 
with the public hearing in cases concerning juveniles. 
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attention to the ECtHR which shows growing use of the principle of the best interests of the 
child and the CRC in general as a guiding legal instrument by increasingly referring to the 
CRC in cases concerning children.15  
A group of common individual applications arising out of alleged violations of Article 8 are 
concerned with cases where national authorities have taken the child into public care without 
consent from the child’s parents. In these situations, the applicant or applicants might allege 
a violation only on their behalf or on behalf of the child or children concerned as well. The 
questions relating to the adult’s standing to bring a complaint on behalf of the child are not 
considered in this thesis due to the presumption that in all decisions affecting a child or 
children, the interests and rights of them are to be considered by the competent authority in 
any event.16 Consequently, as the situations where a child has been taken into care involve 
adults and a child, the child’s rights might be protected only indirectly as the focus of the 
Court is on assessing the balancing of the interests and rights of all parties concerned and 
not solely on the protection of the child.17 
While assessing the domestic authorities’ procedure relating to the balancing of competing 
and/or conflicting rights and interests, the Strasbourg Court has been criticised for not giving 
clear guidance as to how the best interests of the child affects the proceedings, how they 
should be taken into account and what weight is to be given to different factors considered 
to be in the child’s best interests. The Court has reached consensus on the applicability of  
the principle but is criticized from not giving clear guidance as to the substantive issues 
 
15 See e.g. Michael Freeman, ‘Article 3. The Best Interests of the Child’ in A. Alen, J. Vande Lanotte, E. 
Verhellen, F. Ang, E. Berghmans and M. Verheyde (eds), A Commentary on the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007), p. 12 and Ursula Kilkelly, ’The CRC 
in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the Child: 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). 
For case law, see e.g. Popov v. France, Application nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (19 January 2012), para. 
139 where the Court states that “[- -] taking into account of international conventions, in particular the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child”.  
16 This assumption is derived from Article 3(1) of the CRC. For more, see chapter 2. 
17 See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), pp. 239–240. According to Article 34 of the ECHR, the Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of violation by one of the High Contracting State Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or 
the Protocols thereto. Thus, in practice, children too are permitted to bring complaints to the Court by 
themselves or through their representatives. However, usually parents have been allowed to bring a 
complaint on behalf of their children as long as they are empowered to that effect. Nevertheless, the ECtHR 
usually examines the applications from the parents’ perspective. For more, see also Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The 
CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the 
Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 
2014). 
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concerning the concept and due weight to be given to the it in the process.18 Consequently, 
this absence of guidance can place CoE Member States to legally unpredictable and 
uncertain situation. There are scholars who have addressed this legal uncertainty and called 
upon judges to clarify the relevant factors and the weight to be attached to them in 
determining the best interests of the child.19 However, just recently, in the case of Strand 
Lobben and Others v. Norway, judges Kjølbro, Poláčková, Koskelo and Nordén observed 
that the Court still has difficulties in formulating general principles with “desirable clarity 
and coherence” in cases where the general obligations and principles under Article 8 are to 
be balanced against the best interests of the child.20 
Having pointed out the legal uncertainty and the non-existence of clear general principles 
guiding implementation and application concerning the best interests of the child and the 
obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR, inevitably this problem is central to my research. 
Within the range of Article 8 of the ECHR, I will look into the question “how, in a specific 
set of circumstances, should national authorities balance the interests and rights of the child 
on the one hand and the interests and rights of other members of the family on the other hand 
in cases concerning public care and contact rights?”. The authority for finding answers being 
the institution under whose scrutiny the decisions made by domestic authorities under the 
scope of the ECHR can ultimately be placed – The European Court of Human Rights. In 
addition, I will assess the extent in which the ECtHR takes into account Article 3(1) of the 
CRC in the defined cases and in order to make this assessment and somewhat comparison I 
will look into the question “what does the concept of best interests require from national 
authorities in cases concerning public care and contact rights?”.  
 
18 In Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 204, the 
Court stated, “In so far as the family life of a child is concerned, the Court reiterates that there is a broad 
consensus, including in international law, in support the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their 
best interests are of paramount importance”. See also Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, Application no. 
41615/07 (6 July 2010), para. 135 and X v. Latvia, Application no. 27853/09 (26 November 2013), para. 96. 
In the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, the ECtHR also referred to the Implementation 
Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Children’s Fund, Fully revised 
third edition (September 2007) and the UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (May 2008) in seeking guindace to the content of the best 
interests of the child. This case was concerned with international child abduction and thus, not considered 
in this thesis in more detail. 
19 See e.g. Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek ‘Litigating the Rights of the Child: Taking Stock After 25 Years of 
the CRC’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). 
20 Joint dissenting opinion on the merits of the case in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 
37283/13 (10 September 2019), paras. 8–10. 
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1.2 Outline and key terms 
As the focus of this thesis is on the CoE institution, I will not consider regulation and 
jurisprudence of the European Union, such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at any 
stage.21 In addition, I will not examine the application and interpretation of the concept of 
the best interests of the child by the Strasbourg Court in relation to any other Article than 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Thus, even though children’s rights are considered under other 
ECHR Articles as well, such as Article 322, only alleged violations concerning the right to 
respect for private and family life are examined. Nor will I consider promoting and securing 
children’s rights through the CoE’s other key human rights treaty, namely the European 
Social Charter, albeit decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights, set up by the 
Charter, are fully informed by the CRC as well.23 
The studied cases concern situations where a child or children have been placed in public 
care without consent from their parents. Closely connected with alternative care issues are 
questions concerning right of access and contact with the child. Decisions concerned with 
these matters can be seen as interconnected since the way in which a care order is 
implemented has direct impacts on contact between the “original” family members. I do not 
examine and take into account cases concerning, inter alia, adoption, immigrant children or 
international child abduction because the concept of the best interests of the child has been 
given different content and more specific definitions in the field of these matters. Also, the 
ECtHR considers removal of parental responsibilities and adoption as particularly far-
reaching measures which are to be applied only in exceptional circumstances and 
 
21 OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, as amended in OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. The Charter became legally binding 
instrument with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 2007 C 306) on 1 December 2009. The 
Charter contains a dedicated provision on children’s rights as Article 24 articulates the child’s right to 
express their views freely in accordance with their age and maturity, the child’s right to have their best 
interests taken as a primary consideration in all actions relating to them and the child’s right to maintain on 
a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both parents. Thus, it is important to 
understand the difference between these two instruments. 
22 E.g. in the case of A. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 25599/94 (23 September 1998) a child 
complained that he had suffered inhuman and degrading treatment by his father and the State was liable for 
it. This case has been described as a “milestone” to protect children with ECHR and the fact that the ECtHR 
referred to the CRC in order to fill in the gaps in the ECHR provides an example how the Court applies the 
Convention to children positively and dynamically. For more details, see e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, The Child 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 1999), pp. 
11–12 and 186. 
23 The European Social Charter entered into force on 26 February 1965, ETS No. 035. Nevertheless, the 
individual petitioning system under the ECHR provides a more substantial contribution to children’s rights 
advancement. For more about the comparison between these two instruments, see Ursula Kilkelly, ’The 
CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the 
Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 
2014). 
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consequently the assessment of the interests of those concerned is based on slightly different 
principles. These mentioned outlines facilitate the examination of the best interests of the 
child as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the CRC.  
What comes to the key terms of the thesis, the concept “take a child into care” includes 
various situations, such as emergency care orders, normal care orders, foster families as care 
holders, children’s homes and other public institutions as carers, amongst other alternative 
carers. Accordingly, the concept is to be understood as a wide one without any specific 
definition or a regular form. Furthermore, the thesis addresses questions relating to the right 
to maintain contact between, inter alia, the natural family members who have been 
separated. This matter is addressed with either “right of access” or contact rights. In addition, 
in circumstances where a child has been placed in a foster home or with some other carers 
than his or her biological parents, there are number of individuals involved in the case and 
thus, when reference is made to natural parents or biological parents, the ones who have 
actually conceived the child are meant.  
1.3 Approach and sources 
In order to answer my research question, I have been focusing on and analysing the relevant 
sources of international law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.24  The list of sources includes international conventions, international 
custom and general principles of law as primary sources and judicial decisions and teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law. Thus, the method and approach I have deployed is doctrinal and the aim of the thesis is 
to systemize and clarify the legal status of the best interests of the child in the practice of the 
ECtHR in the outlined area by focusing on the relevant sources of international law. 
Throughout the thesis, I have also taken into account the inherent critical element of the 
doctrinal approach by evaluating the relevant and examined sources.25  
I have also studied and taken into account legally non-binding and/or non-enforceable 
instruments, mainly in relation to the CRC, in order to better understand and familiarize with 
 
24 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), adopted as an integral part of the Charter of the 
United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entry into force 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS xvi. 
25 For more about the doctrinal research method, see e.g. Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction 
and Overview’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (2nd edition, 
eBook, EUP 2017) and Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods 
in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 8 Erasmus L Rev 130. 
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the concept. 26  These include General Comments and recommendations given by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) which was established with the 
CRC. The CRC Committee consists of 18 experts of “high moral standing and recognized 
competence” in the field covered by the CRC. 27  Thus, the documents issued by the 
Committee can be considered to be “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists” within 
the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statue.28 State Parties elect the members of the CRC 
Committee from among their nationals who serve in their personal capacity.29 Membership 
in the CRC Committee is for a term of four years but the members are eligible for re-election 
if they are nominated again.30 
The CRC Committee examines the progress made by State Parties in achieving the 
realization of the obligations undertaken in the Convention.31 States Parties are under an 
obligation to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the 
rights recognized in the CRC and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights to 
the CRC Committee.32  The Committee is authorized to make suggestions and general 
recommendations based on, inter alia, the information it receives pursuant to the reports 
made by the State Parties.33 Subsequent to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to 
the CRC on a Communications Procedure (OPCP)34, the Committee is also authorized to 
examine and give its views together with possible recommendations to a State Party in 
relation to communications submitted by individuals complaining to be subjects of 
violations of the CRC.35 
 
26 For more about the term “soft law” and its usage, meaning and inconsistencies, see e.g. Jan Klabbers, 
International Law (1st edition, CUP 2013), pp. 21–40 and Andrew T Guzman and Timothy L Meyer, 
‘International Soft Law’ (2010) 2 J Legal Analysis 171. For the advantages of “soft law” instruments, see 
e.g. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 
International Organization vol. 54, no. 3, 421–456. 
27  For more about the current members and their academic and professional background, see 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/Membership.aspx. The Committee originally consisted 
of ten experts in accordance with Article 43(2) of the CRC but in 1995 the number was increased to 18. For 
an overview about the CRC Committee, see e.g. Ann Skelton, ‘Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law (last updated October 2017).  
28  The ICJ has referred to the Human Rights Committee’s recommendations in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639, 
paras. 66 and 77. 
29 Article 43(2) of the CRC. 
30 Article 43(6) of the CRC. 
31 Article 43(1) of the CRC. 
32 Article 44(1) of the CRC. 
33 Article 45(d) of the CRC. 
34 Adopted by UNGA Res 66/138 (19 December 2011), entry into force 14 April 2014, 2983 UNTS. 
35 For more about the communications procedure, see chapter 2.3.  
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The CRC Committee is internationally the highest institution that interprets specifically the 
content of the CRC. To understand the content and meaning of Article 3(1) of the CRC, the 
comments, observations and recommendations issued by the CRC Committee must be taken 
into account. The fact that the Committee has been authorized to examine individual 
complaints by State Parties to the CRC supports the view of acknowledging the Committee’s 
status as the authoritative source for the CRC. I too consider the documents of the Committee 
as highly relevant ones and for my purposes most importantly because the ECtHR cites and 
refers to them in its judgements.36 Thus, even though the General Comments are not legally 
binding or enforceable, they must be regarded as giving great guidance on the interpretation 
of the CRC.37  
1.4 Structure 
In order to gain a preliminary understanding about the concept of the best interests of the 
child as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the CRC, I will start the thesis in chapter 2 by explaining 
the drafting process and general acceptance of the concept. I will first go through the 
preparatory work of the CRC and place the concept in its context. I will then turn on to it in 
more detail and explain its content and purpose as well as the obligations it imposes to all 
196 State Parties. The criticism which the principle has come across is addressed as to the 
widest extent as possible throughout chapter 2. This chapter also contains a sub-chapter 
which provides examples about how the CRC Committee has implemented and applied the 
concept. The last chapter concludes the previous chapters by demonstrating important 
aspects of the findings in chapter two in relation to situations concerning public care and 
contact rights.  
I will turn on to the second cornerstone of the thesis in chapter 3 by giving an outline of the 
right to respect for private and family life as stipulated in Article 8 of the ECHR and 
introducing the general principles of interpretation applied by the European Court of Human 
Rights in relation to the Convention. In addition to this introductory section, chapter 3 
consists of two approaches to the right stipulated in Article 8, firstly from the viewpoint of 
 
36 E.g. in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 207, the 
ECtHR stated that “it is incumbent on the Contracting States to put in place practical and effective 
procedural safeguards for the protection of the best interests of the child and to ensure their implementation” 
and referred to the CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 85 
and 87. 
37 See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), pp. 14–16 and Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United 
Nations (1st edition, Springer Netherlands 1996), p 275–276.    
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the adult members of the family and secondly, in respect of the child. The purpose of 
chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a basic theoretical understanding about the content and 
interpretation of the key articles before examining their application in the ECtHR practice.  
In chapter 4 I will turn to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases 
concerning public care and contact rights. The first two chapters explain generally the 
procedure in the ECtHR and the general principles relating to the matters under examination. 
Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 are exclusively concerned with issuing care orders and their 
implementation and these chapters focus on the balancing of the interests of the natural 
family members. Chapters 4.5 and 4.6 on the other hand examine the case law concerning 
balancing the interests of the child and other members of the child’s “family” within Article 
8 of the ECHR. Chapters 4.7 and 4.8 are concerned with more general issues which the 
ECtHR has taken into account when balancing the interests of the parties concerned, namely 
the child’s participation in the proceedings and the issue of prolonged proceedings. 
Throughout chapter 4, the case law and considerations of the ECtHR are reflected to the 
findings in chapter 2.  
Chapter 5 concludes the findings made in the previous chapters. I will argue that the ECtHR 
takes the concept of the best interests of the child into account as a general rule but uses such 
a vocabulary in relation to the concept which can lead to confusion as to how much weight 
is required to be given to the interests of the child. Furthermore, I will argue that it might not 
be necessary for the full recognition, implementation and application of the concept of the 
best interests of the child for the Court to point separately how much weight it attaches to 
each and every factor which all together form the circumstances as a whole in a specific 
case. Nevertheless, I will lastly argue that three factors are of special importance when the 
Court considers whether the national authorities have succeeded in striking a fair balance 
between the competing interests. These factors include whether or not the national 
authorities have considered any less intrusive measures before taking a child into care, 
whether they have obtained expert opinions and professionals’ assessment about the 
circumstances and whether the authorities have explicitly considered the child’s interests in 
the first place.  
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2 CONCEPT OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
 
2.1 Drafting and general acceptance 
The concept of the best interests of the child was mentioned already in the United Nations 
1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.38 The Declaration stated that the child shall 
enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other 
means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a 
healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of 
laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration. 
However, in 1959 the majority of the member states of the United Nations gave their support 
rather to a non-binding instrument than to a legally binding treaty in the field of children’s 
rights and the principle was not legally enforceable.39 
At the beginning of the drafting process of the CRC 20 years later, the drafting of a legally 
binding treaty was not regarded as a high priority, even though theoretically the oppositions 
were withdrawn. The first draft submitted by Poland had only little differences with the 1959 
Declaration and the proposal’s aim was mainly to adopt the non-binding provisions of the 
Declaration in a binding treaty. Views, observations and suggestions for the first draft were 
received by the Secretary-General altogether from 28 member states, 15 from non-
governmental organizations and 4 from specialized agencies. Based on these replies, the 
Commission on Human Rights established a Working Group to draft the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. States, which were not members of the Commission, were also allowed 
to participate fully in the drafting process.40 
The generosity and wide application of the principle as suggested in the first draft raised 
objections.41 In 1980 the Working Group submitted an alternative draft according to which 
“In all official actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, or administrative authorities, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration”.42 During discussions in 1981 some delegations 
 
38 UNGA Res 1386 (XIV) (1959), Principle 2.  
39  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), p. 13–14. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Report of the Working Group (10 March 1980) UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1542, para. 44. This formulation was 
suggested by the United States delegation. 
 11 
considered that the first draft offered better protection to the child but in search for a 
compromise, the second draft was agreed to be taken as a basis for discussion.43 One speaker 
expressed the reluctance to adopt the wording of the first draft by stating that the interests of 
the child should be a primary consideration in actions concerning children, as suggested in 
the second draft, but not overriding, paramount consideration in every case, since other 
parties might have equal or even superior legal interests in some cases, giving medical 
emergencies during childbirth as an example.44 At this stage the word “official” was deleted 
from the formulation but otherwise it was left unaltered.45 
There were altogether 16 drafting groups taking part in the drafting process, which meant 
that theoretically many state delegates and non-governmental representatives had to take 
part in more than one working group at a time. The desire to finish the second reading 
presumably led to a rush, which consequently can be the reason why many important issues 
were left undiscussed in detail.46 During the second reading it was again suggested that the 
interests of the child should be the primary consideration rather than “a”. However, the 
proposal was unsuccessful. The only amendment in relation to the concept was that 
“legislative bodies” were added after “administrative authorities”.47   
During the drafting process it was noted that there might occur situations where competing 
interests of, inter alia, justice and the society at large should be of at least equal, if not, 
greater importance than the interests of the child. An observation by Finland, supported by 
the Netherlands, contained that the interests of the child should be “the” primary 
consideration only in actions involving his or her “welfare”. Nevertheless, this proposal was 
opposed by the delegations of Portugal, Australia, Canada and Senegal as it sought to narrow 
the scope of children’s protection.48 In January 1989, the Working Group adopted its report 
and sent it to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration and further dissemination 
to the General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted the CRC by consensus on 20 
 
43 Report of the Working Group (17 February 1981) UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1575, para. 22. 
44 Ibid para. 24. 
45 Ibid paras. 25–26. 
46  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), pp. 14–15. For instance it has been argued that the Working Group took the meaning and 
content of Article 3(1) of the CRC as either for granted or of minor importance. For more, see e.g. Philip 
Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ (1994) 8 Int’l 
JL & Fam 1. 
47 See e.g. Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ 
(1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
48 Report of the Working Group (2 March 1989) UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/48, paras. 117–123. 
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November 1989 and the CRC entered into force on 2 September 1990.49 The principle of the 
best interests of the child was adopted in Article 3(1) of the CRC and it reads as follows 
 “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
 welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
 the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” 
In relation to the substance of the concept, the Venezuelan representative stated that, 
although her delegation was not opposed to the phrase “best interests of the child” being 
included in the final text, she wished to “draw attention to the subjectivity of the term, 
especially if the Convention contained no prior stipulation that the “best interests of the 
child” were his all-round – in other words, physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social – 
development”. The representative noted that it would leave the interpretation of the best 
interests of the child to the judgement of the person, institution or organization in question. 
However, number of delegations expressed their satisfaction with the phrase as it is, and thus 
the representative of Venezuela withdrew her suggestion.50 Ultimately, the Working Group 
adopted the principle of the best interests of the child as it now stands with the following 
reasons: 
“In view of the strength of reservations voiced about making the interests of the child 
“the” primary consideration in all situations and taking into account the fact that 
the delegations which felt that it should be did not insist on this revision, consensus 
was reached to make the interests of the child only “a” primary consideration in all 
actions, as it had been in the text adopted during the first reading.”51 
As was already mentioned, the CRC has been ratified nearly universally, the United States 
of America being the only state that has signed but not ratified it.52 Besides the CRC’s nearly 
universal ratification, the general acceptance which the concept has gained can also be drawn 
from the way it has been used and applied in international level in general.53 The European 
Commission of Human Rights made reference to the principle and its priority already in 
 
49  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), pp. 14–15. 
50 Report of the Working Group (2 March 1989) UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/48, para. 120. 
51 Ibid para. 125. 
52 For status of the treaties visit the United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties on 
https://treaties.un.org/.  
53 See e.g. Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ 
(1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
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1982, when considering the interests and rights of the parent in question by stating that 
“where [- -] there is a serious conflict between the interests of the child and one of its parents, 
which can only be resolved to the disadvantage of one of them, the interests of the child must 
[- -] prevail”.54 The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also emphasized the 
importance of the principle by pointing out “the undoubted right and duty of a domestic 
court to decide in the best interests of the child”.55 Furthermore, the concept of the best 
interests of the child is mentioned in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child 56  and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has referred to the 
principle in multiple occasions.57 The CoE Parliamentary Assembly has also reaffirmed that 
“the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning 
children, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”.58 
The 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women also mentions the best interests of the child in two of its  
Articles59 and Article 5 of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the 
Protection and Welfare of Children with special reference to Foster Placement and Adoption 
Nationally and Internationally states that “in all matters relating to the placement of a child 
outside the care of the child’s own parents, the best interests of the child, particularly his or 
her need for affection and right to security and continuing care, should be the paramount 
consideration”.60 
In addition to Article 3(1), the CRC mentions the concept of the child’s best interest in seven 
other Articles as well.61 For instance, Article 9(1) of the CRC requires that a child shall not 
be separated from his or her parents against their will, unless such separation is necessary 
 
54 Report of the Commission in Wim Hendriks against the Netherlands, Application no. 8427/78 (8 March 
1982), para. 124. 
55 Communication no. 201/1985, Views adopted on 27 July 1988, Appendix I, in Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, UN Doc A/43/40 (1988) Annex VII, para 1. 
56 The Charter entered into force in 1999 and at the time of writing 49 out of 55 Member States of the 
Organization of African Unity have ratified it. According to Article 4(1)”in all actions concerning the child 
undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration”. 
57 See e.g. Conclusion No 47 (1987) on ‘Refugee Children’ in Conclusions on the International Protection of 
Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR. 
58 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2232 (2018) adopted by the Assembly on 28 June 2018, para. 4 
59 1249 UNTS 13. According to Article 5(b), State Parties are under an obligation to take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function 
and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of 
their children, it being understood that the interests of the children is the primordial consideration in all 
cases. Article 16(1)(d) states that in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, the best interests 
of the children shall be paramount. 
60 UNGA Res 41/85 (1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/85. 
61 Reference to the child’s best interests is made in Articles 9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 37(c) and 40(2)(b)(iii).  
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for the best interests of the child. Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on sale of children, child prostitution and pornography62 and on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict63 as well as the OPCP all refer to the concept as well.  
2.2 Interpretation, scope and obligations 
 
2.2.1 In general 
The rules concerning treaty interpretation are codified in the Vienna Convention on the law 
of treaties (VCLT) which entered into force in 1980. 64  The general rules of treaty 
interpretation are stated in Article 31 of the VCLT but these rules are also regarded as 
reflecting customary international law. 65  According to Article 31(1), treaties shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Article 31(2) states 
that the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise first the text, 
including its preamble and annexes as well as any agreement or instrument made by the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. The ICJ has emphasized the text of 
the treaty in its interpretation.66 
It should be noted that none of the CoE Member States have made a reservation in respect 
of Article 3(1) of the CRC.67 Even if a reservation was made by a State Party in relation to 
Article 3(1), the acceptability of such a reservation can be questioned, as Article 3(1) appears 
to “undermine the basic philosophy” of the CRC.68 Thus, making a reservation in relation to 
the best interests principle could be deemed unacceptable in accordance with Article 19(c) 
of the VCLT according to which, a State may formulate a reservation unless the reservation 
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  
Undisputedly there exists neither consensus of what constitutes children’s interests or their 
best interests for that matter nor consensus of factors, which should be taken into account 
 
62 Adopted by UNGA Res A/RES/54/263 (25 May 2000), entry into force 18 January 2002, 2171 UNTS 227. 
63 Adopted by UNGA Res A/RES/54/263 (25 May 2000), entry into force 12 February 2002, 2173 UNTS 222. 
64 1155 UNTS 331. There are 116 State Parties to the Convention.  
65 See e.g. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 
2002, p. 625, para. 37 and Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 
1994, p. 6, para. 41. 
66 Ibid. 
67 For more about declarations and reservations, visit https://treaties.un.org. 
68 For more discussion about reservations in relation to Article 3(1) of the CRC, see e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, 
The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), pp. 51 and 396–399. 
The general rules concerning reservations and declarations made in relation to treaties are codified in the 
VCLT section 2. 
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when considering what would be in the child’s best interests in a particular case. Thus, the 
concept of the best interests of the child is frequently criticized as leaving room for discretion 
to the decision-maker and ultimately leading to a lack of uniformity on domestic level and 
especially on international level. Furthermore, Article 3(1) of the CRC has been criticized 
from dangerously allowing State Parties to adopt an extreme culturally relativist position to 
defend their actions.69 
However, this indeterminacy of the concept should not be over exaggerated as it would have 
not been possible or even practical to try to include an exhaustive list of factors which would 
be applicable in all situations. Even if some sort of list of factors would had been concluded, 
it would have not answered the questions relating to the balancing of other relevant interests 
or the relationship and balancing of the factors themselves. In addition, these criticisms do 
not consider the fact that many other international human rights instruments also leave open 
the question of how to balance one right against another in order to meet the demands of 
justice in a specific case.70 
The wide scope of the concept is understandable in its the context of a provision, which was 
designed to be applicable in a wide range of situations, and it should be noted that a level of 
indeterminacy is a characteristic of human rights norms in general.71 The CRC Committee 
has also emphasized the concept’s dynamic nature and stated that the guidance given in 
relation to the assessment of the best interests of the child does not attempt to prescribe what 
is best for the child in any given situation but rather to provide a framework for assessing 
and determining them. The concept of the best interests of the child is a dynamic one and it 
“encompasses various issues which are continuously evolving”. The CRC Committee has 
pointed out that the flexibility of the concept allows it to response to situations of different 
type of individuals and to evolve knowledge about child development.72 
Furthermore, it has been noted to be one of the Convention’s advantages, at least in contrast 
to most domestic statutes, that it provides a category of distinct rights, which in principle, 
 
69 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), 
pp. 45–47. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ (1994) 
8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
72 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 11 and 34. 
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are considered to be in the child’s best interests.73 The CRC Committee has stressed that 
there is no hierarchy between the rights conferred in the Convention and all the rights are 
primarily in the “child’s best interests”. The Committee has also explicitly stated that in the 
interpretation of Article 3(1) of the CRC, “the rights enshrined in the Convention and its 
Optional Protocols provide the framework” and that a judge, administrative, social or 
educational authority will make concrete use of Article 3(1) when it is interpreted and 
implemented in line with the other provisions.74  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will describe the relevant parts of the preamble as well as 
the rights enshrined in Articles 3(2), 9, 18 and 20 which at least are all relevant in cases 
concerning alternative care of the child and right of access. According to the preamble of the 
CRC for the full and harmonious development of the child’s personality, he or she should 
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. 
The preamble also states that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, 
should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its 
responsibilities within the community.75 
Albeit, family is recognized as the fundamental group of society and natural environment 
for the growth and well-being of children in the CRC, the Convention challenges the 
traditional approach of seeing family life as being in the best interests of the child regardless 
and the assumption that parents or legal guardians of the child would always be capable to 
decide what is in the best interests of the child in different circumstances.76 
Article 3(2) prescribes States Parties obligation to ensure the child such protection and care 
as is necessary for his or her well-being while respecting the rights and duties of parents. 
According to Article 9, a child should not be separated from his or her parents against their 
will except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance 
with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests 
 
73 See e.g. Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ 
(1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
74 See General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 4, 6 and 32. 
75 For more about the recognition of the role of parents and State Parties’ obligations relating to support and 
assistance, see Pia M. van den Boom, ‘Advancing Children’s Rights through Parent Support Services’ in 
Ton Liefaard and Julia Sloth-Nielsen (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Taking Stock after 25 Years and Looking Ahead (eBook, Brill 2017). 
76 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), 
p. 46. 
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of the child. Article 9 continues to state that, for instance, abuse or neglect of the child by 
the parents is an example of a situation where such separation might be necessary. According 
to Article 9(3), the child who is separated from one or both parents has the right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is 
contrary to the child’s best interests.  
Article 18 emphasizes the importance of both parents to a child by stating that States Parties 
shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have 
common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child and the primary 
responsibility for the child’s upbringing and development is on the parents or legal guardians 
with the best interests of the child as their basic concern. For the performance of their “child-
rearing responsibilities”, States Parties shall give appropriate assistance.77 In addition to the 
preamble, Article 18 demonstrates that the CRC recognizes the importance of parents as 
caregivers and primary protectors of children. It should be acknowledged that the “CRC is 
not anti-family or conflicting with parents’ rights” but rather sets international standards for 
children’s rights with the realization that State Parties must provide assistance to families in 
complying with them.78 
According to Article 20, a child who is deprived of his or her family environment either 
temporarily or permanently, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in 
that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State 
and the State shall ensure alternative care, such as foster placement, for such a child. None 
of the CoE Member States have reservations in force in relation to the aforementioned 
Articles either, as reservations made in respect of Article 9 have been withdrawn by Serbia 
(former Government of Yugoslavia) in 1997, Slovenia in 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
2008, Iceland in 2009 and Germany withdrew its reservations in respect of Articles 9 and 18 
in 2010. 
All of these Articles and the preamble shed light to the best interests of the child for which 
reason I too find it important that the CRC is considered as a whole in a particular case and 
circumstances and further guidance in determining the best interests of the child in that 
specific case is searched from other rights enshrined in the CRC. The ECtHR has also 
referred to Article 9(1) of the CRC in relation to the best interests of the child. In Strand 
 
77 Article 18(2) of the CRC. 
78 For more, see van den Boom op. cit. footnote 74. 
 18 
Lobben and Others v. Norway, the Court stated that “an important international consensus 
exists to the effect that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their 
will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance 
with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests 
of the child” and cited Article 9(1) of the CRC.79 
The CRC Committee has given guidance in relation to the concept of the best interests of 
the child in multiple General Comments and observations. According to the CRC 
Committee, Article 3(1) of the CRC expresses one of the fundamental values of the 
Convention and it is considered to be one of the Convention’s four general principles for the 
interpretation and implementation of other Articles. It is a dynamic concept and it requires 
an assessment appropriate to each specific context. It is aimed at ensuring the full and 
effective enjoyment of the rights recognized in the CRC as well as the holistic development 
of the child. Furthermore, the CRC Committee has emphasized the concept’s three-fold 
dimension and given guidance to it as a right, a principle and a rule of procedure.80 The next 
chapters will address each of these dimensions and their additional value to the concept. 
2.2.2  Best interests of the child as a substantive rule 
During the drafting process of the CRC, some representatives expressed their view that 
Article 3(1) did not need to have a reference to specific obligations to State Parties in respect 
of the best interests of the child because paragraph 1 enunciated general principles while the 
specific obligations of States Parties would be listed in the following provisions. 81 
Subsequently, Article 3(1) of the CRC has been envisaged only as a principle of 
interpretation not creating any rights or duties on its own.82 However, in 2013 the CRC 
Committee emphasized that Article 3(1) of the CRC establishes a substantive right and 
creates an intrinsic obligation for State Parties. According to the CRC Committee the right 
is directly applicable, and it can be invoked before a court. The CRC Committee underlined 
 
79 Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 207. The ECtHR has demonstrated compliance in 
referring to more context-specific Articles, such as Article 9, in cases concerning children rather than 
referring to Article 12 for instance which is considered to be one of the CRC’s four general principles. For 
more, see Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek 
(eds), Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and 
International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014) 193–209. 
80 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 1 and 4. 
81 UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1575, para. 24. 
82  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), p. 46 and Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture 
and Human Rights’ (1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
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that in accordance with the concept, a child has the right to have his or her best interests 
assessed and taken as a primary consideration when different interests are being considered, 
in order to reach a decision. As soon as Article 3(1) of the CRC is regarded as a substantive 
right, there is a guarantee that this right is implemented when a decision is to be made 
concerning a child.83  
The formulation “shall be” a primary consideration does not leave room for discretion as to 
whether the best interests of the child should be assessed in the first place but rather obliges 
to make that assessment and place proper weight on those considerations with adequate 
reasoning. The CRC Committee has also emphasized the meaning of “primary 
consideration” and recalled that it means that other considerations are not on the same level 
as those of the child’s best interests due to children’s incapability to fight and promote their 
interests on their own.84 
According to the CRC Committee, there are three obligations inherent in Article 3(1) of the 
CRC. Firstly, State Parties are under an obligation to ensure that the child’s best interests are 
“appropriately integrated and consistently applied” in every action taken by a public 
institution. The second obligation requires to ensure that all judicial and administrative 
action demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been a primary consideration. This 
includes, inter alia, that in a judicial decision it is explicitly described how the best interests 
have been examined and assessed and what weight has been attached to them. Lastly, State 
Parties are under an obligation to ensure that the best interests principle is applied 
accordingly by the private sector. In order to comply with these obligations, State Parties 
shall undertake implementation measures in accordance, inter alia, with Article 4, which 
requires to take all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights stipulated in the CRC.85  
Article 3(1) of the CRC obliges to asses and choose to take the child’s best interests as a 
primary consideration in individual decisions. It requires having children’s best interests 
considered in general, as a group and as individuals. However, a child’s interests must not 
be understood as being the same as those of children in general but rather they must be 
assessed individually.86 It goes without saying that in cases concerning alternative care and 
 
83 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 6. 
84 Ibid, para. 37. 
85 Ibid, paras. 14–15. 
86 Ibid, para. 22–24. 
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contact with a child, the decision will have direct impact on the child in question. Thus, 
Article 3(1) obliges that the best interests of the child are taken as a primary consideration 
in the decision-making process. Taking the right duly into account the decision-maker 
should explicitly state how the best interests of the child have been identified, assessed and 
what weight is attached to them. 
2.2.3 Best interests of the child as a principle of interpretation 
As a principle of interpretation Article 3(1) has the advantage of being considered 
simultaneously and in relation to each of the rights in the CRC as well as in relation to all 
actions concerning children. In each individual case, the particular situation and 
circumstances will define the factors which are to be considered in order to decide what 
would be in the child’s best interests. These include, inter alia, the opinions of the child, the 
child’s sense of time, the need for continuity, the risk of harm and the child’s needs. What 
is distinct about the concept as formulated in the CRC compared to its predecessors is that 
the child should always take part in the assessment of his or her best interests either by him- 
or herself or through a representative as derived from Article 12 of the CRC.87  
The assessment and consequences of a conflict between another right of the CRC and the 
particular interpretation of the child’s best interests in a given case were not considered 
during the drafting process. Although the Working Group drew its attention to the possibility 
of there being other interests at least of equal value than the best interests of the child in a 
given case, there is no guidance as to how these types of conflicts or situations should be 
dealt with in the reports.88 This inevitable possibility of conflict between human rights 
should not, however, be over-exaggerated. Again, there are not many treaty provisions which 
explicitly provide tools for balancing conflicting interests or rights in a given set of 
circumstances.89 
According to the CRC Committee, it is precisely the best interests principle which should 
be taken into account to resolve any conflicts among the rights enshrined in the CRC or other 
human rights treaties. To do so, the possible solutions which are in the child’s best interests 
 
87 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), 
pp. 46–47. For more about Article 12 and the participation of the child, see chapter 2.2.4. 
88 See e.g. Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ 
(1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1 and Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), pp. 48–51. 
89 See e.g. Helen Keller and Reto Walther, ‘Balancing Test: United Nations Human Rights Bodies’, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of International Law (last updated April 2018). 
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must be identified and clarified and this must be done on a case-by-case basis by carefully 
balancing the interests of all parties with the aim of finding a suitable compromise. 
Furthermore, the Committee has emphasized that where harmonization is not possible it 
must be borne in mind that the child’s best interests have a high priority and they are not 
merely one of several considerations. Larger weight must be attached to a solution which is 
considered as the best for the child or children concerned.90 
Placing emphasis on the formulation of Article 3(1) of the CRC with the State Parties’ 
obligation under Article 4 to undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the CRC, it seems that the 
concept of the best interests of the child requires that where there are multiple alternatives 
of outcome in a given case, the burden of proof to establish and demonstrate why, under 
those specific circumstances, another outcome than the one being in the child’s best interests, 
should prevail is on the decision-maker.91 The CRC Committee has emphasized that the 
decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact of the decision 
on the child and the decision’s reasoning must demonstrate that the right has been explicitly 
taken into account. This includes reasoning on what has been considered to be in the child’s 
best interests, what criteria it is based on and how the child’s interests have been weighed 
against other considerations.92 
There will never be an accurate scientific measure to facilitate the determination of what is 
considered to be in the best interests of the child. This, however, should not be regarded as 
devaluing the importance of Article 3(1) of the CRC. Applying the principle together with 
other Articles of the Convention, especially with Article 5 of the CRC which takes into 
account the evolving capacities of the child, allows to understand the need for different 
degree of protection, provision, prevention and participation at different stages of 
 
90 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 33 and 39. 
91 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), 
pp. 50–51 and Philip Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human 
Rights’ (1994) 8 Int’l JL & Fam 1. 
92 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 6. 
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childhood.93 Effective protection of the child’s rights requires that this evolving nature of 
childhood is taken into account when the child’s best interests are considered.94 
One criticism faced by the concept relates to the impossibility to predict a decision’s long-
term implications and different factors’ long-term effects on the development of the child.  
This inability to predict family relations and interpersonal relationships in the future should 
be taken into account in decisions on every level – whether domestic or international. The 
potential negative implications of this deficit are, however, diminished by subjecting the 
decisions under review either from time to time or at least by way of more than a one court 
instance.95 The ECtHR favours the approach to take decisions concerning public care and 
restrictions on contact under review by domestic authorities after a period of time has passed 
since the first decision was made96 albeit, to guarantee that the natural parents’ right to 
respect for family life is protected accordingly. However, as the natural family environment 
is considered to be the best environment for the child to develop and grow unless it is 
contrary to his or her best interests, reviewing the decisions can be seen as in the child’s 
interests as well.  
The first decisions to take a child into public care or restrictions on contact do not become 
final in the traditional sense of res judicata as such in the CoE Member States. These 
decisions become legally valid in accordance with domestic legislation, but if the family’s 
circumstances later change there might no longer be relevant and sufficient reasons to keep 
the child in public care or to restrict contact between the natural family members and 
consequently, the matter can be subjected to a second set of proceedings.97 Thus, in my 
opinion the criticism relating to the impossibility to predict future relationships should not 
be considered as an obstacle in relation to the full implementation and recognition of the 
principle at least in situations under research here. In theory, domestic authorities could 
assess the best interests of the child from time to time. Whether this leads to a situation, 
 
93 According to Article 5 of the CRC, “State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of 
the rights recognized in the present Convention”. 
94  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), pp. 50–51. 
95 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), 
pp. 47–48. 
96 For more, see chapter 4.4.3. 
97 This is due to obligations inherent in Article 8 of the ECHR. For detailed reasons, see chapter 3. 
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where the child is constantly under stress is again a situation which elimination is ultimately 
the responsibility of national authorities. 
After almost thirty years since the CRC entered into force, it should be regarded as 
inadequate application of Article 3(1) if a decision-maker merely states that the best interests 
of the child have been considered or that the decision was based on the best interests of the 
child without giving further reasoning as to why and based on what grounds. Besides the 
judicial framework provided for the best interests principle, the assessment of the best 
interests of the child should not be made based on legal assumptions or exercised in isolation 
from the reality of the circumstances or child psychology and development. As will become 
evident in chapter 4.2.3, the Strasbourg Court takes into account how the national authority 
has assessed the reports and opinions issued by child institutions, child psychologists and 
other experts who have recommended some solution as in the child’s best interests and what 
weight has been attached to them.98  
2.2.4 Best interests of the child as a rule of procedure   
The CRC Committee has recognized that all actions taken by domestic authorities inevitably 
affect children in one way or another and thus clarified that the full respect and recognition 
of Article 3(1) does not mean that every action taken must incorporate formal process of 
assessing and determining the best interests of the child but a greater level of protection and 
detailed procedures are appropriate where a decision will have a major impact on a child or 
children. 99  The Committee has listed cases concerning, inter alia, paternity, family 
reunification, accommodation, custody, residence or contact as examples of civil cases 
where the child might be defending his or her interests directly or through a representative 
and where the court must provide for the best interests of the child to be considered and 
demonstrate that they have effectively done so.100 
As already briefly mentioned, Article 3(1) is one of the four general principles in the 
interpretation and implementation of the CRC as a whole. Another general principle is 
 
98 In relation to permitting contact between a biological father whose paternity has not been established and 
the child, the ECtHR has already stressed that the decision should not be made based on legal assumption 
but rather the authorities should consider in the specific circumstances whether permitting contact would be 
in the child’s best interests. For more, see chapter 4.5. 
99 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 20. 
100 Ibid, para. 29. 
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established in Article 12 which enshrines the child’s right to be heard.101 According to 
Article 12, a child who is capable of forming his or her own views, has the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting him or her and the views of the child are to be 
given due weight in accordance with his or her age and maturity. For this purpose, the child 
shall be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings 
affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a 
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. The provision clarifies that it is 
the adult’s duty to listen and respond to the child given that the child might struggle to be 
heard for a variety of reasons.102  
The CRC Committee has emphasized that hearing the child as stipulated in Article 12 is a 
mandatory step. The best interests of the child are to be established in consultation with the 
child and this factor is of crucial importance. The Committee has highlighted the 
inseparability and interdependency of Articles 3(1) and 12 and it has explicitly stated that if 
the requirements of Article 12 are not met, the concept of best interests of the child is not 
correctly applied.103 Furthermore, the Committee has emphasized that this right is not tied 
in with age and State Parties should not introduce age limits that would restrict this right.104 
The dominant approach in relation to Article 12 appears to be that there is no fixed procedure 
as to how the child should be heard but that it should rather be done flexibly and after 
receiving the child’s views the weight attached to them should be considered in accordance 
with the child’s age and maturity.105  
What comes to the requirement of forming the views “freely”, the CRC Committee has stated 
that the child should be able to express his or her views “without pressure” and “without 
undue influence” or manipulation.106 The Committee acknowledges that the “hearing” of a 
 
101 The two remaining general principles are Article 2 (the child’s right to non-discrimination) and Article 6 
(child’s right to life, survival and development). For more about each of the principles, see e.g. Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, paras. 41–45 and 
General Comment No. 7 (2005) UN Doc CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, paras. 9–14. 
102 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), 
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and 
International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014).  
103 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 43 and General Comment No. 12 (2009), 
UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12, paras. 70–74. See also the decision in Y.B. and N.S. v. Belgium, Communication 
no. 12/2017. For more detailed discussion of the case, see chapter 2.3. 
104 General Comment No. 12 (2009), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12, para. 21. 
105 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), 
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and 
International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). 
106 General Comment No. 12 (2009), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12, para. 22. 
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child is difficult and can have traumatic impacts and thus the conditions and environment 
for the child to express his or her views must be safe and secure. Closely connected to the 
right to express his or her views is the requirement to provide the child with adequate 
information in order to form his or her views if the child so wishes to do. According to the 
Committee, it is not necessary that the child has comprehensive knowledge about all aspects 
of the matter, but he or she must have sufficient understanding in order to appropriately form 
his or her views on the matter.107 
The other principle of interpretation in international law introduced by the CRC, namely the 
principle of the evolving capacities of the child as stipulated in Article 5, is closely related 
also to the procedural requirements of Article 3(1) of the CRC.108 The CRC Committee has 
stressed that the more a child knows, has experienced and understands, the more the adults 
legally responsible for him or her have to “transfer direction and guidance into reminders 
and advice, and later on to an exchange on an equal footing”.109 However, whatever the age 
of a particular child, each and every child has the same rights to have their best interests 
assessed even if they cannot or will not express their views. It is for the States to ensure 
appropriate arrangements for the assessment of their best interests.110  
It seems like the procedural aspects of Article 3(1) of the CRC have been recognized within 
the CoE, as on 8 September 1995 the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention 
on the Exercise of Children’s rights (ECECR)111 which entered into force on 1 July 2000. 
The object of the Convention is, in the best interests of children, to promote their rights, to 
grant them procedural rights and to facilitate the exercise of these rights by ensuring that 
children are, themselves or through other persons or bodies, informed and allowed to 
participate in proceedings affecting them before a judicial authority.112 It is stated in the 
preamble of the Convention that “children should be provided with relevant information to 
enable such rights and best interests to be promoted and due weight should be given to the 
views of children”. However, the recognition of these rights and the additional value of the 
 
107 Ibid, paras. 21 and 23–25. 
108 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1995), p. 15. For the content of Article 5 of the CRC, see op. cit. footnote 93. 
109 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 44 and General Comment No. 12 (2009), 
UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12, para. 84. 
110 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 44. 
111 ETS No. 160. 
112 Article 1(2) of the ECECR. 
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Convention were criticized already before its entry into force and up until today it has entered 
into force only in 20 Member States of the CoE.113 
2.3 Implementation of Article 3(1) of the CRC 
Although the reporting system established in the CRC can be identified as one of the methods 
of promoting and protecting human rights in international law and an attempt to strengthen 
the form of such an enforcement mechanism114 the lack of individual petitioning system 
together with the ineffective remedies has been frequently argued to be one of the CRC’s 
weaknesses. It has been argued that the CRC has provided theoretical protection for children, 
but the lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms and remedies has been described as a 
gap between the Convention’s obligations and the effective recognition of the rights of 
children.115   
Thus, the OPCP which entered into force on 14 April 2014 can be seen as a call for action 
in relation to incomplete recognition of the rights enshrined in the CRC in practice.116 By 
becoming a Party to the Protocol, the state recognizes the competence of the CRC Committee 
to, inter alia, examine individual communications submitted by or on behalf of an individual 
or group of individuals, claiming to be victim or victims of a violation of rights set forth in 
the CRC and give recommendations to the parties concerned. 117  While examining 
communications, the CRC Committee is guided by the principle of the best interests of the 
child and the Committee shall also have regard for the rights and views of the child, the 
 
113  The up to date status of the state parties can be verified from Council of Europe Treaty Office on 
https://coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/160. For more about the critique, see e.g. 
Caroline Sawyer, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back – The European Convention on the Exercise of 
Children’s Rights’ (1999) 11 Child & Fam L Q 151. 
114  See e.g. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1995), pp. 378–379. 
115 See e.g. Marta Santos Pais, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children, 
‘Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a 
communications procedure’, (14 December 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.7/1/CRP.7 and Peter Newell, 
‘Submission to Open-ended Working Group of the Human Rights Council, considering the possibility of 
elaborating an Optional Protocol to provide a communications procedure for the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child’, (9 December 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.7/1/CRP.2. Also, the CRC Committee has 
emphasized that “for rights to have meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations” in 
its General Comment No. 5 (2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5. 
116 See e.g. Dubravka Hrabar, ‘Bringing the Non-Protection of Children’s Rights through the Optional Protocol 
to the CRC on Communications Procedure and a Future European Court’ (2017) 8 Croat Acad Legal Sci 
YB 13. In addition, an international campaign to draft such a Protocol had received great support after a 
communications procedure to the ICESCR was adopted in 2008. For more about the motives behind the 
Optional Protocol, see e.g. Sarah Spronk, ‘Realizing Children’s Right to Health; Additional Value of the 
Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure for Chilren’ (2014) 22:1 Intl J Child Rts 189.  
117 Articles 1, 5 and 10 of the Optional Protocol.  
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views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child.118 
The OPCP recognizes that children’s special and dependent status may create real 
difficulties for them in pursuing remedies for violations of their rights. In addition, State 
Parties recognize that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration to be 
respected in pursuing remedies for violations of the rights of the child, and that such 
remedies should take into account the need for child-sensitive procedures at all levels.119 
Thus, State Parties are also encouraged to develop appropriate national mechanisms to 
enable a child whose rights have been violated to have access to effective remedies at the 
domestic level.120  
The Protocol established two procedures of protection, a communication procedure under 
Article 5(1) and an inquiry procedure for grave or systematic violations under Article 13. 
According to Article 5(1), communications may be submitted by or on behalf of an 
individual or group of individuals, within the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be 
victims of a violation of that State Party of any of the rights set forth in any of the following 
instruments to which that State is a party: (a) The Convention; (b) The Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; (c) the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The 
established procedure was envisaged to be a child-friendly one, but whether or not it actually 
became one has been criticized. Nevertheless, the Optional Protocol provides an opportunity 
for children to become involved in the recognition of their rights.121 
As of 31 January 2020, there are 52 signatories to the OPCP and 46 State Parties have ratified 
it.122 Whether or not the procedure established by the Protocol is successful or providing 
further guidance as to the interpretation of the CRC and the concept of the best interests of 
the child is yet hard to say. At the time of writing the Committee has received 29 
communications and ruled 13 of them as inadmissible and decided to discontinue 8 of them. 
 
118 Article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 
119 The Preamble of the Optional Protocol. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See e.g. Sarah Spronk, ‘Realizing Children’s Right to Health; Additional Value of the Optional Protocol on 
a Communications Procedure for Chilren’ (2014) 22:1 Intl J Child Rts 189 and Suzanne Egan, ‘The New 
Complaints Mechanism for the Convention on the Rights of the Child; A Mini-Step Forward for Children’ 
(2014) 22 Int’l J Child Rts 205. 
122 For up to date status of the State Parties, see the United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties on 
https://treaties.un.org. 
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Most of the considered cases – 7 out of 8 – are concerned with immigration situations where 
a child has entered another State with or without identification documents and/or residence 
permit.123 55 % of the communications submitted include Spain as the Respondent State and 
almost 21 % Denmark. Clearly the range of Respondent States is not yet a wide one either.124  
The case of Y.B. and N.S. v. Belgium125 concerned a child who was taken under a fostering 
arrangement from Morocco by a Belgian-Moroccan couple and the State Party had denied 
granting the child a humanitarian visa. The State Party and the couple had a different 
understanding about the relationship which the fostering arrangement established, as the 
couple correlated it with adoption while the State Party considered it to be similar than what 
was known in Belgian law as a ‘special guardianship’ which is revocable and ends when the 
child reaches adulthood.126  
In relation to effective implementation of Article 3(1) of the Convention, the CRC 
Committee has established a twofold procedure to be followed when assessing and 
determining the best interests of the child in a specific situation. Firstly, within the specific 
factual context, the decision-maker must find out what are the relevant elements in the 
assessment, give them concrete content and assign a weight to each element in relation to 
one another. Secondly, in order to apply the first step, the decision-maker must follow a 
procedure which ensures legal guarantees and proper application of Article 3(1) of the 
CRC.127 
Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, the Committee stated that “in all actions 
concerning children, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration” and “the 
concept should be adjusted and defined on an individual basis, according to the specific 
situation of the child or children concerned, taking into consideration their personal context, 
situation and needs”. Additionally, in order to make an individual decision, the best interests 
of the child must be assessed and determined in light of the specific circumstances of the 
particular child.128 The CRC Committee also made reference to Article 12 of the CRC and 
 
123 See e.g. N.B.F. v. Spain, Communication No. 11/2017 (27 September 2018) UN Doc CRC/C/79/D/11/2017 
and I.A.M. v. Denmark, Communication No. 3/2016 (25 January 2018) UN Doc CRC/C/77/D/3/2016. 
124 For the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee, see https://juris.ohchr.org/en. 
125 Communication No. 12/2017 (27 September 2018) UN Doc CRC/C/79/D/12/2017. Although the case does 
not shed light particularly on public care and contact rights issues, I will shortly describe the CRC 
Committee’s assessment in order to demonstrate the application of the concept by the Committee. 
126 See the decision text para. 4.2. 
127 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 46. 
128 See the decision text para. 8.3. 
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pointed out that “any decision that does not take into account the child’s views or does not 
give their views due weight according to their age and maturity, does not respect the 
possibility for the child or children to influence the determination of their best interests”.129  
In this case, the Committee observed that the child was 5 years old when the authorities 
made the second decision concerning the denial of the humanitarian visa. The Committee 
stated that the child would have been “perfectly capable of forming views of her own 
regarding the possibility of living permanently with the authors”. The Committee pointed 
out that the implications of the proceedings were directly tied to the child’s chances of living 
with the couple as a member of their family. The Committee observed that the State Party 
did not specifically consider the best interest of the child when it assessed the application for 
a visa and did not allow her to be heard and hence, was in breach of Articles 3 and 12 of the 
CRC.130 
What should be pointed out is that like the CRC Committee stated, it is for the national 
authorities to examine the facts and evidence of the case and to interpret and enforce 
domestic law. The Committee’s task is to ensure that the national authorities’ assessment 
was not arbitrary or tantamount to a denial of justice and that the best interests of the child 
were a primary consideration in that assessment.131 Based on this brief review, the CRC 
Committee’s assessment does not seem to be much different than that of the European Court 
of Human Rights under its own Convention. As will be explained in chapter 3.3, in cases 
concerning children the ECtHR’s assessment has on some occasions been confined to 
guarantee that the procedural requirements under Article 8 have been secured and that the 
domestic authorities’ decision-making process has not been arbitrary. Similarly, it seems 
that the CRC Committee emphasized in the aforementioned case that the duty to explicitly 
identify and clarify the best interests of the child and involve the child in the proceedings 
were met.  
2.4 Concluding remarks 
National authorities are under an obligation to identify and transparently explain what the 
best interests of the child are considered to be in particular circumstances. Furthermore, 
when a child is taken into public care or natural parents’ right of access is restricted, the 
 
129 See the decision text para. 8.7. 
130 See the decision text paras. 8.8–8.9. 
131 See the decision text para. 8.4. 
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decision should transparently explain how the child’s best interests have been identified, 
what they were considered to be and how they have been considered and balanced against 
the interests of the parents or other interests. These decisions have direct and crucial impacts 
on the child and the best interests of the child must be stated out loud in order for them to be 
reviewed.  
Balancing the interests of the child and those of parents bores into and shakes the traditional 
ideology of family privacy and the freedoms of parents. There are multiple reasons argued 
in opposition of the recognition of the wide range of children’s rights provided in the CRC, 
such as arguing that children do not have the capacity to have rights. Even though it is well 
evidenced nowadays that children can be “highly competent, technically, cognitively, 
socially and morally”.132 As mentioned, the CRC has also been regarded as “anti-family” 
despite the references made in the CRC to the effect of supporting the family and parents in 
their child-rearing responsibilities.  
More transparent reasoning by courts and education about the CRC in general133 would 
secure and provide better sense of legitimacy altogether. Transparent reasoning is the only 
way how the parties concerned can assess whether they accept the outcome or not. If the 
parties are suspicious about the application and interpretation of the law in their case, the 
reasoning must provide elements which persuade to understand the outcome. Thus, without 
any explanation why some option has been considered to be in the child’s best interests, the 
decision might appear arbitrary and the adult in question might get a sense of being on the 
opposite side without having his or her rights fully acknowledged.134   
Secondly, the child must be involved in identifying his or her best interests, either by him or 
herself or through a representative. The involvement of the child in proceedings concerning 
him or her should not be seen as an obstacle but rather as a way to recognize the child as an 
individual possessing the human rights designed especially for the child. It should be realized 
that the involvement does not mean the same as a ruler of the outcome but that the non-
involvement can have severe and detrimental effects on the child and the child’s 
 
132 For more about the different oppositions and counterarguments, see Michael Freeman, ‘Why it remains 
important to take children’s rights seriously’ in Michael Freeman (ed), Children’s Rights: Progress and 
Perspectives: Essays From the International Journal of Children’s Rights (eBook, Brill 2011) 5–25. 
133 According to Article 42 of the CRC, State Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the 
Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike.  
134 For more about the interconnectedness of reasoning and legitimacy, see e.g. Michael D Daneker, ‘Moral 
Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy’ (1993) 43 Am U L Rev 49. 
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development.135 The adult is also responsible to respond to the views of the child for which 
reason the child’s views must be given appropriate consideration in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child. Thus, the decision should also be transparent on factors such as 
what the views of the child were, how they were acquired and what weight was attached to 
them.  
Thirdly, it should always be considered whether parents or other adults responsible for the 
child actually can always represent the child. It has been noted on several occasions that the 
interests of the child and those of his or her parents might not always coincide, and the 
motives of the parent might not support the best interests of the child. The ECtHR has also 
acknowledged this in its case law.136 Within the CoE, the adoption of the ECECR supports 
the view of recognizing the importance of impartial representation as according to Article 
9(1), in proceedings affecting the child where the holders of parental responsibilities are 
precluded from representing the child as a result of a conflict of interest between them and 
the child, the judicial authority shall have the power to appoint a special representative for 
the child. Article 4 grants the child the right to apply for a special representative in cases 
where there is a conflict of interests between the holders of parental responsibilities and the 
child.   
Lastly, as Article 3(1) of the CRC has such a multidimensional character, the vocabulary 
used when discussing about Article 3(1) of the CRC should, in my opinion, be standardized. 
It is somewhat diminishing to speak about Article 3(1) only as a principle because it takes 
the focus on the legal obligations it imposes away. Thus, I find it more coherent to speak 
about the concept of the best interests of the child when all the dimensions of Article 3(1) 
are meant and only about the principle when the role and impact as a tool for interpretation 
are meant. The fact that the CRC Committee uses the formulation “concept” in its decisions 
on submitted communications supports this view also.137  
 
135 See e.g. Stacey Platt, ‘Set Another Place at the Table: Child Participation in Family Separation Cases’ 
(2016) 17 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 749 and Aisling Parkes, Caroline Shore, Conor O’Mahony and Kenneth 
Burns, ‘The Right of the Child to Be Heard: Professional Experiences of Child Care Proceedings in the 
Irish District Court’ (2015) 27 Child & Fam L Q 423 and Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The CRC in Litigation Under 
the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014), p. 203. 
136 E.g. Kopf and Liberda v. Austria Application no. 1598/06 (17 January 2012). For the ECtHR considerations, 
see chapter 4.6. 
137 See e.g. the decision of Y.B. and N.S. v. Belgium, Communication No. 12/2017 (27 September 2018) UN 
Doc CRC/C/79/D/12/2017, para. 8.3. 
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3 RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
 
 
3.1 Outline and interpretation of the Convention 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the family, as a unit and its 
individual members, like no other human rights convention in international law. The most 
apparent source for the protection is Article 8 of the Convention which already broad scope 
was and is interpreted dynamically by the European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights.138 Furthermore, Article 12 of the Convention protects the 
right to marry and found a family and Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention139 
recognizes the parents’ important role in the education of their children. In addition, Article 
5 of the Seventh Protocol140 guarantees equality between spouses in relation to their children 
during marriage and in the event of dissolution.  
The cases examined in chapter 4 are concerned with alleged violations of the right to respect 
for private and family life due to national authorities’ decision to take a child into public 
care or restrict or ban right of access. Thus, the focus is on the right as stipulated in Article 
8 of the ECHR which reads as follows 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
138  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 187. On 1 November 1998 the permanent European Court of Human 
Rights was set up in the context of Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Court replaced the previous control system. 
139 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 20 
March 1952, entry into force 18 May 1954) ETS No. 009. 
140 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 
22 November 1984, entry into force 1 November 1988) ETS No. 117. 
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Both of these paragraphs originate from the UDHR adopted in 1948 although, during the 
Convention’s drafting process, the wording of the provision was modified several times.141 
It has been well established in the Strasbourg Court’s case law that the essential object of 
Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by public authorities.142 States 
are under an obligation to “act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a 
normal family life”. Nevertheless, this primarily negative obligation not to interfere 
arbitrarily in one’s private and family life creates also positive obligations which are inherent 
in an effective “respect” for family life.143 The protection under Article 8 has been expanding 
persistently and it has been described as “one of the richest areas of legal development” by 
the ECtHR.144 
Article 8 covers four interests which contain various overlapping and inter-related areas. 
None of these interests is defined in the Convention and the right’s content and scope is 
imprecise in general as well.145 There is no clear-cut line between private and family life and 
consequently certain matters may be examined under both concepts. 146  The traditional 
approach of the Strasbourg organs has been to accept that close relationships which are short 
of “family life” will generally fall within the scope of “private life”.147 Thus, the Court has 
found that for instance in cases concerning the establishment or contestation of paternity, the 
determination of a man’s legal relations with his legal or putative child might concern his 
“family” life but that the question can be left open because the matter undoubtedly concerns 
 
141 For a detailed overview about the drafting process, see e.g. William Schabas, The European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 2015), p. 358–366. 
142 See e.g. Hadzhieva v. Bulgaria, Application no. 45285/12 (1 February 2018), para. 58, Kopf and Liberda v. 
Austria, Application no. 1598/06 (17 January 2012), para. 38, Hokkanen v. Finland, Application no. 
19823/92 (23 September 1994), para. 55 and X and Y v. The Netherlands, Application no. 8978/80 (26 
March 1985), para. 23. 
143 See e.g. Popov v. France, Application nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (19 January 2012), para. 133 and Marckx 
v. Belgium, Application no. 6833/74 (13 June 1979), para 31. 
144 William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 2015), p. 
366. 
145 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 501. 
146 William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 2015), pp. 
366–367.  
147 See e.g. Lazoriva v. Ukraine, Application no. 6878/14 (17 April 2018), paras. 61 and 66 and Paradiso and 
Campanelli v. Italy, Application no. 25358/12 (24 January 2017), para. 165.  
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that man’s private life.148 The same approach has been applied to an adopted child’s right to 
know her personal history.149 
As Article 8 is wide in scope and imprecise in its content, it allows taking into account legal 
and social change. The ECtHR, as a result of the Court’s “living instrument” doctrine150, has 
taken a broad approach what comes to defining the interests in question and as a result the 
scope of protection under Article 8 has become wide. Applying this approach in cases 
concerning children, the Court enhances the applicability of the ECHR to children as well. 
For instance, as it is becoming more widely accepted in the CoE Member States that a child 
has a right to know his or her birth parents, the right for private and family life could be 
interpreted as implicitly granting the child such a right.151 
Most of the parental disputes concerning the care of children are resolved within the private 
sphere of family but situations where state interference is required do occur. Situations where 
a judicial or administrative authority has to settle a dispute between the parents always 
involve an interference with the family life of the other parent. By nature, the placement of 
a child into public care or restrictions concerning contact are always regarded as 
interferences within the meaning of Article 8.152  The Convention allows individuals to 
submit applications of alleged violations to the ECtHR and primarily the Convention has 
been used to raise questions of particular violations of human rights in a Member State.153 
In cases arising from individual applications, the Court’s task is to examine whether the 
 
148 See e.g. Schneider v. Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), para. 82, Shofman v. Russia, 
Application no. 74826/01 (24 November 2005), para. 30 and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Application no. 
8777/79 (28 November 1984), para. 33. 
149 Odièvre v. France, Application no. 42326/98 (13 February 2003), para. 28. 
150 See e.g. Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 5856/72 (25 April 1978), para. 31. 
151 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 501 and Ursula Kilkelly, The Child 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 1999), 
pp. 13–14. 
152 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 510 and Ursula Kilkelly, The Child 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 1999), 
pp. 199 and 239. See also e.g. K. and T. v. Finland (2001) para. 173. In more ambiguous cases, the burden 
of proof to establish that the state has interfered with a Convention right is on the applicant.  
153 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), pp. 3–4. 
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manner in which domestic legislation was applied in particular circumstances was 
compatible with the Convention rights.154 
As a general rule, in its application of Article 8 the Court will first decide whether an 
interference with the applicant’s right has occurred and in cases of affirmative answer, 
continue to consider whether that interference was justified within the meaning of Article 
8(2).155 In order to justify any interference in private and family life, the Government must 
demonstrate that the measures in question were in accordance with the law, pursued a 
legitimate aim and were necessary in a democratic society. I will look into each of these 
conditions in the next chapter but first, I will shortly explain the general principles of 
interpretation applied by the Court when assessing the domestic decisions and their 
compatibility with the Convention.  
The doctrine of margin of appreciation, developed by the Court in 1976, is widely related 
with Article 8 due to the right’s wide scope and possibility to limitations. The doctrine has 
been described as “an obligation to respect, within certain bounds, the cultural and 
ideological variety, and also the legal variety, which are characteristic of Europe”.156 The 
doctrine allows certain amount of discretion to the Member States which varies based on 
circumstances and issues in question. Generally, the Court is not eager to deviate from 
practice common to Member States and in relation to issues where a common ground, at 
least to some extent, can be found, the margin of appreciation will be narrower than in cases 
where there is no consensus between the states.157 Furthermore, the margin of appreciation 
will be narrower in cases where there is a “particularly important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity” at stake.158 
 
154 See e.g. William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 
2015), p. 367. For case law, see e.g. Anayo v. Germany, Application no. 20578/07 (21 December 2010), 
para. 69.  
155 See e.g. William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 
2015), p. 367. 
156 The quote has been made by the ECtHR’s former judge Franz Matscher. For more, see Ursula Kilkelly, The 
Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 
1999), pp. 6–7. 
157 Ibid. E.g. in Marckx v. Belgium Application no. 6833/74 (13 June 1979), para. 41 the Court relied upon the 
law of the “great majority” CoE Member States in relation to the status of children born out of wedlock. 
For more, see D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), pp. 8–10. 
158 See e.g. William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 
2015), p. 368. 
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A second principle of interpretation is the principle of proportionality according to which an 
interference with the Convention right can be justified if the measure was proportionate to 
the aim which it sought to achieve.159 In order for the Court to be convinced that the measure 
in question was necessary in a democratic society, the domestic authorities must have 
succeeded to “strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and of 
society as a whole”.160 Thus, when a child is taken into public care, the Court examines 
whether the domestic decision-making process and the implementation of the decision have 
achieved a fair and appropriate balance between the interference in family life and the rights 
and interests of the child. The principle of proportionality recognizes that the right to respect 
for family life is not absolute.161  
Furthermore, the Court has on multiple occasions stated that the Convention cannot be 
interpreted in a vacuum, but in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Hence, any 
relevant rules of international law applicable to the Contracting Parties must be taken into 
account.162 Accordingly, in cases concerning children, the CRC and the rights it confers to 
the child must be taken into account. The advantage of this approach is that the child-specific 
provisions of the CRC could be combined with the ECHR’s effective petition system and 
subsequently it would maximize the potential of both of these instruments in promoting and 
protecting children’s rights.163  
In the next two chapters, I will explain the scope of Article 8 more precisely. I will first 
explain the concept of “family life” and then turn on to the specific obligations owed to those 
families by domestic authorities in order to effectively comply with the Article’s obligations. 
What makes an interference justified is also discussed in general in the chapter concerned 
with the obligations. The final part of this chapter considers specifically the child’s rights 
under Article 8. I have decided to consider them in their own section since the obligations 
 
159  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 9. 
160 See e.g. Nazarenko v. Russia, Application no. 39438/13 (16 July 2015), para. 63, Shofman v. Russia, 
Application no. 74826/01 (24 November 2005), para. 34, K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 
(12 July 2001), para. 194, Kroon and Others v. The Netherlands, Application no. 18535/91 (27 October 
1994), para. 31, Hokkanen v. Finland, Application no. 19823/92 (23 September 1994), para. 58 and Keegan 
v. Ireland, Application no. 16969/90 (26 May 1994), para. 49. 
161  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 9. 
162 See e.g. Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, Application no. 14737/09 (12 July 2011), para. 85 (i). 
163 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘The CRC in Litigation Under the ECHR’ in Ton Liefaard and Jaap E. Doek (eds), 
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and 
International Jurisprudence (Springer 2014). 
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are traditionally considered from the point of a view of parents and, as shortly mentioned in 
the introduction, the rights of the child are usually protected only indirectly and thus, I want 
to draw the attention to rights owed to children in theory under the ECHR already before 
entering chapter 4. 
3.2 Parents and other adult members of the family 
 
3.2.1 Overview of the scope of protected individuals  
The notion of “family life” has extended from the traditional way it was adopted in 1950 as 
the Commission and Court have interpreted the concept flexibly, taking into account the 
diversity of modern family arrangements.164 It has been well established in the Court’s case 
law that family life under Article 8 is not confined only to marriage-based relationships and 
it may cover other de facto family ties where the parties are living together out of wedlock. 
A child born out of such a relationship is ipso jure part of that family unit from the moment, 
and by the very fact, of the birth.165 Despite the fact that later, in chapter 4, I will only 
examine cases where “family life” is found to be existing, I will shortly describe some of the 
different circumstances and relationships relevant for my purposes where Article 8 is 
applicable and the interests of the relevant adult member of the family on the one hand and 
the child on the other might come into clash and the authorities in question are required to 
balance them.  
For instance, in Marckx v. Belgium166 the Court stated that a single mother and her child 
constituted a family and subsequently the same approach has been applied to a single father 
and his adopted son.167 In addition, family life has been adequately found to exist between 
siblings 168  and between grandparents and grandchildren. 169  The Court determines the 
existence of family life on a case by case basis and makes the decision based on facts 
 
164 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 505 and Ursula Kilkelly, The Child 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 
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168 Mustafa and Armağan Akin v. Turkey, Application no. 4694/03 (6 April 2010), para 19, Moustaquim v. 
Belgium, Application no. 12313/86 (18 February 1991), para. 36 and Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), Application 
no. 10465/83 (24 March 1988). 
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depending upon the existence of close family ties in practice.170  The Court takes into 
account, inter alia, whether a couple lives together, the length of their relationship and 
whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children or by 
other means.171  
A biological kinship does not guarantee the applicability of Article 8 since “family life” 
requires further legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal 
relationship. Generally, cohabitation is required for a relationship to be regarded as 
amounting to family life. However, exceptionally other factors may demonstrate that a 
relationship has sufficient consistency to create de facto family ties.172 Where family life has 
not yet fully been established is not attributable to the applicant, the Court has considered 
that also intended family life could fall under the protection of Article 8. This applies 
particularly to the potential relationship between a child born out of wedlock and the natural 
father. The nature of the relationship between the natural parents and a demonstrable interest 
in and commitment by the father to the child before and after birth are factors to be 
considered in order to determine whether there exists a close personal tie in practice.173 
The relationship between foster parents and a child who has been reunited with his or her 
natural family, was unexamined by the Court for quite a while, although the Court’s 
approach to find family life to exist in cases of legal tie favoured the assumption to find 
family life to exist between members of a foster family as well.174 In recent case law, the 
Court has considered a relationship between foster parents and a child as falling within the 
notion of family life where the child had lived with the foster parents from the age of one 
month for a period of 19 months because there had been a close inter-personal bond between 
the foster parents and the child and the foster parents had behaved in every respect like the 
child’s parents.175  
 
170 See e.g. K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 150. 
171 See e.g. Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands, Application no. 42857/05 (3 April 2012), para. 50. 
172 See e.g. Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, Application no. 1598/06 (17 January 2012), para. 35 and Schneider 
v. Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), para. 80.  
173 See e.g. Schneider v. Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), para. 81 and Anayo v. 
Germany, Application no. 20578/07 (21 December 2010), paras. 56–57. See also D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, 
E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 506. For more cases, see the CoE, ECtHR: Guide on Article 8 of the 
Convention – Right to respect for private and family life (last update 31.8.2019), p. 56. 
174 See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 212. 
175 See Moretti and Bendetti v. Italy, Application no. 16318/07 (27 April 2010), paras. 49–50.  
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Furthermore, in K. and T. v. Finland the Court found that both of the applicants, the 
biological mother of two children and the biological father of one of them, enjoyed “family 
life” within the meaning of Article 8 with both children even though there was no biological 
or legal tie between the second applicant and the older child. The Court observed that even 
though there was no biological link between them, they had all lived together until the child 
was voluntarily placed in a children’s home and later taken into public care. The Court stated 
that prior to the birth of the applicants’ mutual child, the applicants and the older child had 
formed a family with a clear intention of continuing their life together and the same intention 
existed regarding the new-born baby.176  
Once family life has been established, it does not cease to exist upon divorce or when the 
parties no longer live with each other. Existing family life does not come to an end when a 
child is taken into public care either.177 Thus, the legally recognized tie between natural 
family members is strong, and the Court has expressly stated that only exceptional 
circumstances, even in case of adoption, might break it.178 Nevertheless, the existence of 
family life only determines that Article 8 is applicable in a given case and it is yet to be 
determined whether the interference in question was justified within the meaning of Article 
8(2). In the next chapters I will explain the scope of effective respect owed to families and 
requirements for justified interference by national authorities in general.  
3.2.2 Negative and positive obligations 
As mentioned, the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities and States are under the obligation to “act in a manner 
calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life”. In cases concerning 
alternative care and contact rights with a child, the ECtHR has well established that one of 
the fundamental elements of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 is the mutual 
enjoyment by a parent and a child of each other’s company and any domestic measures 
hindering the mutual enjoyment, such as taking the child into care, amounts to an  
 
176 Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 150. 
177 See e.g. Rieme v. Sweden, Application no. 12366/86 (22 April 1992), para. 54 and Eriksson v. Sweden, 
Application no. 11373/85 (22 June 1989), para. 58. 
178  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), pp. 188–189. 
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interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.179  
The Court has stressed that splitting up a family is a very serious interference and there must 
be “sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests of the child” supporting 
the decision to do so. 180  The fact that a child could be placed in a “more beneficial 
environment for his or her upbringing will not on its own justify a compulsory measure of 
removal” and there must exist other circumstances pointing to the “necessity” for such an 
interference.181 Nevertheless, the Court has acknowledged that the best interests of the child 
are a paramount factor and depending upon their nature and seriousness, they may prevail 
over those of the parents.182 However, even if the original decision to take a child into public 
care would be based on reasons justifiable under Article 8(2), difficulties may arise due the 
fact that the family relationship is not terminated by that decision.183  
Once a child has been taken into public care, the national authorities might have positive 
obligations in order to comply with the obligation to effectively respect family life. The 
identification of conditions where positive obligations exists is not, however, easy. The 
Court has, inter alia, recognized that the varying circumstances in Member States affect 
what is required to ensure effective respect for family life. 184  Nevertheless, positive 
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for family life, 
including the implementation of specific steps where appropriate. These positive obligations 
may also involve the adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations of individuals 
between themselves. In both, negative and positive contexts of obligations, regard must be 
 
179 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 202, 
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had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests and the State’s 
margin of appreciation.185 
Positive obligations inherent in effective respect for family life include an obligation for the 
national authorities to take measures with a view to reuniting parent with their children when 
they have been separated.186 The national authorities are under an obligation to take “all 
necessary steps” that can reasonably be demanded in the specific circumstances of each 
case.187 Accordingly, the positive obligations are not confined to ensure that children can re-
join their parents or have contact with them, but also extend to “all preparatory steps to be 
taken”.188 In Glaser v. The United Kingdom the Court reiterated that Article 8 includes a 
right for a parent to have measures taken with a view to his or her being reunited with the 
child and an obligation for the national authorities to take such measures. This obligation 
applies to cases dealing with the compulsory taking of children into public care and the 
implementation of care measures and cases where contact and residence disputes concerning 
children arise between parents and/or other members of the children’s family.189  
Furthermore, national authorities are under an obligation to take measures in order to 
facilitate reunions between a parent and a child and support contact between them.190 
However, the Court has stated that the in relation to contact between a non-custodial parent 
and a child, the obligation to facilitate contact is not absolute and rather one of means than 
of result. The Court has recognized that the establishment of contact may not be able to take 
place immediately and it may require preparatory or phased measures.191 However, the Court 
has also emphasized that the danger of restricting access and contact is that the family 
relations will be curtailed altogether and thus these restrictions are placed under a strict 
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scrutiny by the Court.192 Positive obligations include also a duty to exercise exceptional 
diligence in children related proceedings since delays in the proceedings can ultimately 
determine the case.193 
Article 8 imposes also procedural requirements for the protection of individuals at the 
domestic level. The inherent procedural requirements were formulated by the Court in 1987 
to form an implicit part of Article 8. In particular, the involvement of parents in the decision-
making process concerning their children has been found to form a part of the obligations 
under Article 8. This requirement seeks to guarantee that the parents are provided to a 
sufficient degree with requisite protection of their interests. The Court has not yet extended 
the requirement to involve children in the proceedings.194 However, the Court could interpret 
Article 8 more child-friendly by taking into account in its judgements whether the child’s 
interests are promoted by a distinct representation.195 
3.2.3 Requirements for justified interference 
According to Article 8(2) of the ECHR, interference in family life is justified if it is 
demonstrated to be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in 
a democratic society. All of these conditions must be met. It seems that generally the 
measures amounting to interference, such as taking the child into care or restricting right of 
access, have basis in national legislation and that the aim of the interference has been to 
protect “the health and morals” or “the rights and freedoms of others”, namely those of the 
child. Thus, what more often requires further assessment and consideration is whether the 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.  
Although, for instance in Eriksson v. Sweden, the applicant alleged that the Swedish law’s 
quality did not satisfy the requirements of the phrase “in accordance with the law” within 
the meaning of Article 8. In that case, the Court reiterated the requirements for the phrase: 
the law must be sufficiently precise, there must be a measure of protection against arbitrary 
interferences by the public authorities and if the law confers discretion, its scope and manner 
of exercise must be indicated with sufficient clarity to afford such protection. The Court also 
 
192 See e.g. Schneider v. Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), para. 94. 
193 For more discussion concerning the obligation to exercise exceptional diligence, see chapter 4.8. 
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pointed out the legislator’s incapability to take into account in advance all circumstances in 
which for instance the removal of a child will come into question and thus the general terms 
and a wide measure of discretion was justified, taken together with the preparatory work of 
the legislation giving adequate guidance to the interpretation and the competence of the 
administrative courts to review at several levels the decisions made pursuant to the 
legislation in question.196 
In relation to the legitimate aims pursued with the interference in relation to children, the 
Court has recognized that the best interests of the child might determine whether the 
interference has been consistent with Article 8(2) of the ECHR. However, traditionally the 
Court’s considerations of the concept have reflected the traditional form which is more 
associated with welfarism rather than the CRC’s formulation which also requires to take into 
account the child’s evolving capacities and the child’s right to be heard, as was explained in 
chapter 2. The Court has been criticized from the lack of clearly highlighting which factors 
are to be taken into account when applying the concept or how decisive each factor is.197 
In order to determine whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the 
Court will assess whether the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in 
particular, whether the measure was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. These 
considerations include examination on whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the 
reasons adduced to justify the interference were relevant and sufficient and whether the 
decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under 
Article 8.198 The notion of proportionality implies that where the interference is more far 
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 44 
reaching and severe, the stronger the reasons must be in order to justify it. Thus, reasons for 
prohibiting contact with a child altogether must be stronger than reasons for restricting 
contact.199 While considering the necessity of the measure in question, the Court has stated 
that consideration of what lies in the best interests of the child concerned is of paramount 
and crucial importance and depending on their nature and seriousness, the child’s best 
interests may override those of the parents.200 
3.3 Children’s rights under Article 8 
According to Article 1 of the ECHR, states are to secure rights and freedoms conferred in 
the Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction.201 Thus, Article 8 equally protects the 
right to respect for private and family life of children and it has a significant potential to 
advance the rights of children. In Maslov v. Austria, the Court reaffirmed the child’s right to 
respect for family life.202 The Court’s approach to develop the procedural requirements 
inherent in Article 8 and its focus on the positive obligations have especially been regarded 
as strengthening the Convention’s potential to protect children and it has been already 
envisaged that the procedural requirements of Article 8 could lead to a finding by the Court  
that consultation with the child in question is essential part for effective protection of their 
rights.203 
Under Article 8 of the ECHR, the child’s right to respect for family life includes, inter alia, 
the right to be cared by his or her parents, the right to maintain contact with both  
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parents204, the right not to be separated from parents except where it is in the child’s best 
interests and the right to family reunification. Even though the best interests principle is not 
expressly stipulated in the ECHR, the principle is well incorporated in the ECtHR’s case 
law.205 Furthermore, it has been envisaged that the dynamic interpretation of Article 8 will 
expand the scope of protection to the need for independent representation for children in 
terms of providing the child means to express his or her opinions and views as well as to 
safeguard the child’s individual interests.206 
Indirectly, by rejecting parents’ claims concerning alleged violations of their right, Article 8 
protects the child also by finding a removal of the child to be justified where it is found to 
be necessary in order to protect the child’s rights and interests. The ECtHR has generally 
found this to be the case in situations where domestic decisions have been based on suspected 
or confirmed abuse or neglect. Obviously, the Court has found the removal of a child as 
justified in cases where the relevant parent has been convicted of abuse by the domestic 
courts or where evidence of ill-treatment is provided. Positive obligations to effectively 
protect a child’s right to respect for family life may also include preventive measures taken 
by public authorities in order to protect the child from abuse.207  
In cases where there is no physical danger or abuse inflicted on the child in question, but 
rather other type of neglect have proven to be more difficult in relation to justifying the 
placement of a child in alternative care. The European Commission on Human Rights has 
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considered that severe conditions of neglect, an inability to take care of child’s medical and 
welfare needs and in certain situations unsanitary and impoverished living conditions may 
justify an interference with the family. However, in these situations positive obligations 
inherent in Article 8 oblige a State to take pro-active measures to give guidance and support 
to the family in question before the removal of the child.208 In R.M.S. v. Spain the Court 
noted that unsatisfactory living conditions or material deprivation never amount to relevant 
and sufficient reasons on their own but other factors such as psychological state of parents 
or inability to provide their child with emotional and educational support have been affecting 
the decision as well.209  
The Court has acknowledged that depending upon the nature and seriousness of the best 
interests of the child, his or her interests may prevail over the interests of parents. The Court 
has stated that primarily, the child’s best interests are considered to be firstly, to have the 
child’s ties with his or her family maintained, unless it is proved that such ties are undesirable 
and secondly, to be allowed to develop in a sound environment.210 The Court has stated that 
it is in the child’s best interests to maintain ties with his or her family unless the family has 
proved particularly unfit and it is in the child’s best interests to ensure his or her development 
in a safe and secure environment.211 Furthermore, the Court has stated that such matters as 
the child’s age and level of maturity, the wishes of the child, the presence or absence of 
parents and the environment and experiences are factors involved in the assessment of what 
the child’s best interests are.212  
The Court has deviated from its general approach to make a difference between actions 
which are attributable to a State and which are not in cases concerning children. The reason 
for this deviation has been suggested to be the “overwhelming importance” incorporated into 
the principle of the best interests of the child.213 This interpretation would comply with the 
 
208 Ibid, pp. 173–174. 
209 Application no. 28775/12 (18 June 2013), para. 84. 
210 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 207, 
Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, Application no. 14737/09 (12 July 2011), para. 85 (v) and Y.C. v. The 
United Kingdom, Application no. 4547/10 (13 March 2012), para. 134. 
211 Y.C. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 4547/10 (13 March 2012), para. 134. 
212 Ibid, para. 135 and Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, Application no. 14737/09 (12 July 2011), para. 85 
(v). Albeit, these principles were at first identified in a case concerning international child abduction, they 
were later acknowledged in the case of Y.C. v. the United Kingdom concerned with the taking a child into 
care. 
213 William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 2015), p. 
393. Questions concerning attribution are important as they determine when a State Party to a treaty is 
responsible for the conduct and action of its organs. For more general overview, see e.g. Lucius Caflisch, 
‘Attribution, Responsibility and Jurisdiction in International Human Rights Law’ (2017) 10 ACDI 161. 
 47 
CRC’s requirement that in all actions the best interests of the child are to be of primary 
consideration and the States are obliged to guarantee this, inter alia, by legislation in 
accordance with Article 4 of the CRC.  
In relation to the right to respect for private life the ECtHR has stated that Article 8 intends 
to ensure the development of the personality of each individual in his relations with other 
human beings. Inherent to private life is the notion of personal autonomy which provides for 
example the right to establish details of one’s identity as a human being.214 This observation 
acknowledges that individuals have “a vital interest in establishing the biological truth about 
an important aspect of their private and family life and having it recognized by law”215 which 
in turn involves, inter alia, the determination of paternity.216 Article 8 grants the right for a 
child to know his or her origins as the failure to receive the information may imply mental 
and psychological suffering.217  
The Court has stated on several occasions that in cases involving the care of children and 
contact restrictions, the child’s interests must come before all other considerations218 and 
that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance.219 Nevertheless, what level 
of importance should be attached to the principle in domestic decisions in order to protect 
the child’s right but also ensure compatibility with Article 8 is somewhat unsure. The next 
chapter addresses this dilemma and looks into the application of the best interests of the child 
in the ECtHR case law in cases concerning the alternative care of the child and restrictions 
on the right of access. 
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allow it. For case law, see chapter 4.5. 
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4 CASE LAW – THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND THE RIGHT TO 
RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
 
4.1 Procedure of the ECtHR 
In cases arising from individual applications, the Court has to confine itself, as far as 
possible, to an examination of the concrete case before it in order to determine whether the 
manner in which the legal provisions were applied to or affected the individuals concerned 
gave rise to a violation of the ECHR.220 While making this assessment, the Court takes into 
account the margin of appreciation accorded to national authorities in the specific 
circumstances.221 The margin of appreciation will vary in the light of the nature of the issues 
and the seriousness of the interests at stake. Two competing interests could be for instance 
the importance of protecting a child in a situation threatening his or her health or 
development and on the other hand the aim to reunite the family as soon as circumstances 
permit.222  
While making the assessment concerning the compatibility of an intervention with Article 
8(2) of the ECHR, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the 
appropriateness of intervention in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to 
another. These perceptions depend on, inter alia, traditions relating to the role of the family, 
traditions relating to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for 
public measures in the care of children. Albeit, “consideration of what is in the best interests 
of the child is in every case of crucial importance”.223 
It should be recalled that the ECtHR is not bound by its previous interpretations of the 
Convention. 224 The Court stated in Cossey v. The United Kingdom that it is free to depart 
from an earlier judgement if there are “cogent reasons” for doing so. According to the Court, 
reasons for a departure could be warranted to ensure that the ECHR reflects societal changes 
and remains in line with present-day conditions. However, the Court “usually follows and 
 
220 See e.g. Eriksson v. Sweden, Application no. 11373/85 (22 June 1989), para. 54. 
221 See e.g. K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 154 and Glaser v. The United 
Kingdom, Application no. 32346/96 (19 September 2000), para. 64. 
222 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 211, 
Kutzner v. Germany, Application no. 46544/99 (26 February 2002), para. 67 and K. and T. v. Finland, 
Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 155. 
223 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 210 
and Kutzner v. Germany, Application no. 46544/99 (26 February 2002), para. 66. 
224 D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition, OUP 2018), p. 23. 
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applies its own precedents, such a course being in the interests of legal certainty and the 
orderly development of the Convention case-law”.225 
The Court has rarely interfered with domestic decisions where a child has been removed 
from the family based on suspected or confirmed abuse or neglect if the reasons given by 
the domestic authorities for the removal have been “relevant and sufficient”.226 The Court 
has on several occasions noted that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact 
with all the persons concerned partly for which reason it is not for the Court to substitute 
itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities and the domestic 
courts are to decide whether the measures in question have been in the child’s best 
interests.227 Thus, the Court has traditionally accepted the national authorities’ assessments 
concerning the necessity of a care order in situations concerning the taking of children into 
public care228  and the Court has determined in relation to the procedural requirements 
“whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family 
situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, 
material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the 
respective interests of each person”.229 
However, the restraint from the assessment of the necessity of measures might be changing. 
In K. and T. v. Finland judge Palm and judge Gaukur Jörundsson pointed out in their partly 
dissenting opinion that the judgement was the first of a kind where the Court rejected the 
national authorities’ understanding and assessment whether it was necessary or not to take 
the child into public care by finding a violation of Article 8 in relation to a decision to take 
a new-born baby into emergency care.230 Furthermore, in Strand Lobben and Others v. 
Norway, the Court pointed out that it can attach weight to the factor whether national 
authorities attempted to assist and support the family with other less intrusive measures 
 
225 Cossey v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 10843/84 (27 September 1990), para 35. 
226  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 170. 
227 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 210, 
Schneider v. Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), paras. 94 and 99, Anayo v. 
Germany, Application no. 20578/07 (21 December 2010), para. 66 and K. and T. v. Finland, Application 
no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 154. 
228 See e.g. the partly dissenting opinion of judge Palm, joined by judge Gaukur Jörundsson in K. and T. v. 
Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001). 
229 See e.g. Petrov and X v. Russia, Application no. 23608/16 (23 October 2018), para. 98 and mutatis mutandis 
cases of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, Application no. 41615/07 (6 July 2010), para. 139 and Karrer 
v. Romania, Application no. 16965/10 (21 February 2012), para. 40. 
230 Op. cit. footnote 229. 
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before the care order, and this demonstrates that the wide margin of appreciation traditionally 
enjoyed by national authorities in assessing the necessity to take a child into care is not to 
unfettered.231 
While making the assessment of the necessity of the impugned measures, the Court considers 
whether the reasons for the measures were relevant and sufficient within the meaning of 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR. This assessment leads to a situation where the reasoning of the 
national authorities is found to be relevant and sufficient, relevant but not sufficient or 
neither relevant nor sufficient on some grounds identified by the Court. Where the reasons 
given by the national authorities have heavily relied upon what has been considered to be in 
the child’s best interests, the Court inevitably considers and rules something about these 
reasons. If no violation of Article 8 is found, the Court can either state that the reasons were 
relevant and sufficient without explaining why in detail or identify why the reasons for the 
measure considered to be in the child’s best interests were relevant and sufficient. Thus, the 
Court has a considerable role and impact in interpreting the concept. 
4.2 General principles in cases concerning public care and contact rights 
The Strasbourg Court has recognized that national authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in assessing the necessity to take a child into care but, a stricter scrutiny is 
applied in relation to any further limitations, such as restrictions placed on parental rights of 
access and any legal safeguards securing the right of parents and children to respect for their 
family life.232 Stricter scrutiny is called for because any further limitations “entail the danger 
that the family relations between a young child and a parent will be effectively curtailed”.233 
Thus, even if it was deemed to be necessary for the child to stay in alternative care for a long 
period of time, the object to eventually lift the care order must guide all the arrangements 
made during that period.234 
 
231 Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 211. For more discussion, see chapter 4.3.1. 
232 See e.g. K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 155 and Elsholz v. Germany, 
Application no. 25735/94 (13 July 2000), para. 64. See also D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. 
M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th 
edition, OUP 2018), pp. 548–549. 
233 See e.g. Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, Application no. 1598/06 (17 January 2012), para. 41, Schneider v. 
Germany, Application no. 17080/07 (15 September 2011), para. 94 and Anayo v. Germany, Application 
no. 20578/07 (21 December 2010), para. 66, Kutzner v. Germany, Application no. 46544/99 (26 February 
2002), para. 67 and K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 155. 
234  Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), p. 271. 
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Care orders in situations where the child has been sexually abused, physically injured either 
directly or indirectly by a failure to protect the child from physical injuries, where the child 
is living in circumstances of neglect – such as deplorable conditions, without light or heat – 
or where the child suffers neglect or ill-treatment as a result of a parent’s alcohol or drug 
addiction, have been regularly found to be compatible with Article 8.235 Nevertheless, it is 
for the State to establish that a careful assessment of the impact of the proposed care measure 
on the parents and the child as well as of the possible alternatives to taking the child into 
public care, was carried out prior to the implementation of such a measure.236 
The Court has well established that a guiding principle in relation to care orders is that they 
ought to be regarded as temporary measures, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances 
permit and the implementation of the measures should be consistent with the ultimate aim 
of reuniting the natural parents and the child.237 National authorities “must do their utmost 
to facilitate reunion of the family” but any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be 
limited since the best interests of the child must be taken into account.238 According to the 
ECtHR, the minimum to be expected of the authorities is to examine the situation anew from 
time to time to see whether there has been any improvement in the family’s situation.239 The 
duty to take measures to facilitate the reunification will have progressively more weight from 
the commencement of the period of care, however, always being subjected to considerations 
of what is in the best interests of the child.240 
As was mentioned in chapter 3.3, the Court has identified some factors to be in the best 
interests of the child. Firstly, the child’s best interests are that his or her ties with the natural 
family are maintained unless this is not desirable. The Court has clarified the content of 
“desirable” by stating that “unless the family is unfit”. Second of all, it is in the child’s best 
 
235  Ibid, pp. 263–265. 
236 K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 166 in relation to emergency care 
orders. The CRC entered into force in Finland on 20 June 1991 and the emergency care orders were made 
in 1993. 
237 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 208, 
Jovanovic v. Sweden, Application no. 10592/12 (22 October 2015), para. 77, K. and T. v. Finland, 
Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 178, Johansen v. Norway, Application no. 17383/90 (7 
August 1996), para. 78 and Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), Application no. 10465/83 (24 March 1988), para. 81. 
238 See e.g. K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), paras. 178 and 194. 
239 See e.g. K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), para. 179. For the implementation 
of the care orders, see chapter 4.4.3. 
240 See e.g. Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, Application no. 37283/13 (10 September 2019), para. 208, 
R.M.S. v. Spain, Application no. 28775/12 (18 June 2013), para. 71, Kutzner v. Germany, Application no. 
46544/99 (26 February 2002), para. 76 and K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001), 
para. 178. 
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interests to be allowed to develop in a sound environment. The Court has clarified this factor 
as well by qualifying the term sound environment as “safe and secure”.241 Furthermore, the 
Court has acknowledged that the child’s age and maturity, the wishes of the child, the 
presence or absence of parents and the environment and experiences are all factors to be 
considered when the best interests of the child are determined.242 
In relation to right of access between the natural family members, the Court has generally 
accepted as justified to restrict or prohibit access when the need for providing stability in the 
child’s upbringing so requires, when the parent is on observation and the child must not be 
influenced by that, when the child needs to be kept away from a situation which could be 
detrimental for the child’s mental development due to a loyalty conflict vis-á-vis one or both 
parents or the foster parents and where a conflict in relation to the care of the child exists.243  
According to the Court, the question whether the deprivation of access is justified must be 
assessed in the light of the circumstances obtaining at the time when the decisions were taken 
and not with the benefit of hindsight.244 The ECtHR has also stated that when assessing 
whether specific restrictions such as prohibiting contact by mail or telephone are justified 
the broader context of the restrictions and access as a whole should be taken into account.245 
However, a parent cannot be entitled to have any measures taken that would harm the child’s 
health and development. 246  Nevertheless, particularly harsh restrictions on the right to 
maintain contact between the natural family members can be imposed only in exceptional 
circumstances when the overriding importance of the best interests of the child so requires.247 
The next chapters will look in detail to the judgements of the ECtHR and describe how the 
Court actually balances the interests of the parties concerned and especially the best interests 
of the child first in relation to care orders and secondly in relation to the implementation of 
 
241 Op. cit. footnotes 211–212. 
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the care orders. In relation to care orders, the Court takes into account many factors in 
determining whether the reasons for the decision have been “relevant and sufficient” within 
the meaning of Article 8(2) of the ECHR. Based on the survey of case law in relation to 
more ambiguous cases than the ones mentioned above, I have decided to look into more 
detail in the following recurring factors – whether preventive and less intrusive measures 
were adopted before the care order was issued and whether the amount and quality of expert 
and professional reports provided adequate grounds to assess what was in the best interests 
of the children.  
Chapter 4.4 addresses the questions concerning contact between a biological father and his 
child in a situation where the child has another man recognized as his or her legal father and 
chapter 4.5 discusses contact issues between the child and other members of the child’s 
recognized “family”. In the final chapters I will consider matters relating to the child’s 
participation and the severe consequences of prolonged proceedings. 
The examined cases have been chosen based on the date of judgement and the year of the 
domestic proceedings in question in order to make sure that the CRC has entered into force 
in the Member State in question at the time of relevant decisions made by national 
authorities. However, as the proceedings in the ECtHR take years and proceedings as a 
whole in domestic instances might take years as well there are some exceptions to this 
general rule and some of the cases might concern national decisions made prior to the entry 
into force of the CRC in that particular State Party. These exceptions are highlighted in the 
text alongside reasons for explaining them regardless.248 
4.3 Alternative care of the child – separating the natural family members 
 
4.3.1 Consideration of preventive and/or less intrusive measures 
Already in 1988, prior to the entry into force of the CRC, the Court took into account in its 
assessment of care order’s compatibility with Article 8 whether any alternative measures 
 
248 The fact that a State Party to the CRC might have signed the CRC at the time of the relevant domestic 
decision but the Convention has not yet entered into force through ratification, acceptance, accession or 
succession diminishes this difficulty a bit, since according to Article 18 of the VCLT, a State is obliged to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed a treaty. 
Furthermore, as the principle of the best interests of the child was recognized also in the 1959 Declaration, 
domestic decisions made prior to the entry into force of the CRC might have reasoning as to the best 
interests of the child. Nevertheless, I will not make any claims and arguments as to the content of the 
concept based on assessments and considerations prior the entry into force of the CRC and thus, as a general 
rule, ECtHR judgements concerned with domestic decisions made at the time when Article 3(1) of the CRC 
has not yet been applicable have been ruled out.  
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had been taken with a view to assisting the family before the children were taken into 
alternative care. The Court found that providing social care and special education to mentally 
retarded children, home-therapy and a psychiatric team to the whole family and in addition 
holding five case conferences with the natural parents and social authorities before taking 
the children into public were enough to satisfy this requirement.249 However, the Court 
concluded that the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary 
to take the children into care, “especially since the preventive measures had proved 
unsuccessful” and hence whether there was a “requirement” to consider them in those 
circumstances is not self-evident.  
In K. and T. v. Finland two children were taken into emergency care mainly due to their 
mother’s mental illnesses. 250  Afterwards also normal care orders were issued and the 
parents’ rights of access were heavily restricted.251 Here, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 8 in relation to the decision to take a new-born baby into emergency care but not in 
relation to the emergency care order of the 5 year-old child or in relation to the normal care 
orders. The Court stated that keeping in mind that the authorities’ primary task was to 
safeguard the interests of the children, there was no reason to doubt that the placement in 
public care was called for rather than continuation of the open-care measures or even 
introduction of new open-care measures. The less intrusive measures already taken in 
relation to the older child was the initial placement of the child in a children’s home for a 
period of three months with the idea of that placement being regarded as a short-term support 
measure and which the applicants did not contest.252  
In relation to the new-born baby, the father had stayed with her in the children’s ward at the 
hospital and subsequently moved to a family centre with her and later agreed to leave the 
baby there with the intention that by progressive contacts between them she would 
eventually move in with him. The social welfare authorities paid his travel expenses to the 
centre and after his paternity was established, he was granted joint custody with the child’s 
mother.253  
 
249 See Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), Application no. 10465/83 (24 March 1988), paras. 9–11 and 72–74. 
250 Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001). 
251 For discussion and observations relating to the right of access, see chapter 4.4. 
252 See paras. 18–19. 
253 See paras. 35–40. 
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In Kutzner v. Germany the ECtHR considered the circumstances surrounding the care orders 
and their implementation as a whole and found a violation of Article 8 relating to the care 
orders themselves and, “above all”, to the manner in which they were implemented. Here, 
two children, 4 and 6 years old, placed in alternative care never had the opportunity to reunite 
with their natural family as their placement was from time to time continued and the national 
authorities imposed strict restrictions on contact between the natural family members.254 In 
relation to the less intrusive measures, the Court noted that although the educational-support 
measures taken initially subsequently proved to be inadequate, it was questionable whether 
the domestic administrative and judicial authorities gave sufficient consideration to 
additional measures of support as an alternative to what is by far the most extreme measure, 
namely separating the children from their parents. The Court also pointed out that two of the 
psychologists retained as expert witnesses and the family doctors had recommended that the 
children should be given additional educational support.255 
Prior to the care orders, the children received educational assistance and attended a day-
nursery school for children with special needs due to their late physical and mental 
development. The children had undergone a series of medical examinations and a social 
worker visited the family at home officially for ten hours a week, although this was contested 
by the natural parents.256 In its decision to remove the children from their natural parents, 
the domestic court stated that the parents lacked the necessary awareness to answer their 
children’s needs and that they opposed to receiving any support from social services. 
According to the domestic court, the children’s development was so retarded that any less 
radical measures would be inadequate and only a foster home could help.257 It is important 
to observe that as the ECtHR pointed out, “unlike the position in other cases of the same 
type that have come before the Court, there have been no allegations that the children have 
been neglected or ill-treated by the applicants”.258  
Thus, the positive obligations requiring providing assistance to the parents in order for them 
to provide an adequate environment for their children can be considered to be wider in scope 
than in cases where a child is subject to other type of neglect. Although the ECtHR did not 
 
254 Application no. 46544/99 (26 February 2002), paras. 70 and 81–82. The implementation of the care orders 
is considered in chapter 4.4.1. 
255 Paras. 73 and 75. 
256 Paras. 12–13. 
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explicitly say so but nevertheless, by referring to the duty to consider the best interests of 
the child259, the case demonstrates that it cannot be argued to be in the child’s best interests 
to immediately separate the child from his or her family merely due to the parents’ 
intellectual shortcomings or emotional deficiencies.260 Since the family is regarded in the 
CRC as the natural environment for the child’s development as well and states are under an 
obligation to provide to a sufficient degree assistance to the families in order for them to 
comply with the CRC, the interpretation of the ECtHR in relation to the positive obligations 
under Article 8 can be seen as consistent with the CRC.  
In R.M.S. v. Spain the Court explicitly stated that the national authorities should have 
considered other less drastic measures than taking the child into care. The Court pointed out 
that role of the social welfare authorities is “precisely to help persons in difficulty” and in 
this case the authorities had not taken any other measures before they decided to take the 
child into care.261 Here the applicant had sought assistance from authorities due to difficult 
financial circumstances which in turn led the authorities to find that the applicant’s daughter 
had been “legally abandoned” and she was placed in a children’s home and later without the 
applicant’s knowledge transferred to another children’s home.262 The Court observed that 
the child had not been subjected to violence, physical or psychological ill-treatment or to 
sexual abuse nor had the national courts noted anything about lack of emotional 
development, worrying health problems on the part of the child or psychological instability 
on the part of the parents.263 Since the Court explicitly made reference to these factors and 
cited case law relating to these issues, the Court presumably finds arguments stating that it 
was in the best interests of the child to be taken into public care in circumstances where at 
least one of these factors is present.  
Recently, in the case of Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, the Court cited both of the 
last-mentioned cases as examples where the Court has attached weight to whether the 
authorities first attempted to take less drastic measures, such as supportive or preventive 
ones, and whether these had proved unsuccessful and explicitly stated that the margin of 
 
259 Para. 76. 
260 See e.g. para. 54.  
261 Application no. 28775/12 (18 June 2013), para. 86. 
262 Para. 73. 
263 Para. 84. 
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appreciation of Member States in relation to the necessity to take children into public care is 
not unfettered.264  
Based on these decisions, the Court’s approach can be interpreted to evolve to a direction 
where the positive obligations of Article 8 are widened in scope and consequently, the 
national authorities’ margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity to take a child into 
care is becoming smaller. Hence, Article 8 can be interpreted as requiring that at least some 
less intrusive measures are considered and attempted and only after the attempt has proved 
to be unsuccessful the reasons for public care might exist, however, with the exception that 
if the best interests of the child require an immediate decision, the national authorities must 
be allowed to make it. Consequently, in these situations it would be enough to provide 
relevant and sufficient reasons why the best interests of the child require that no less intrusive 
measures were considered first. 
It is clear from the CRC Committee’s General Comments and general discussions as well 
that the State Parties are obliged to provide assistance for parents and families in parents 
“performance of their child-rearing responsibilities” as stated in Article 18(2) of the CRC. 
During general discussions the importance in helping parents to cope with economic and 
psychological stress and other risk factors have been emphasized and the need for “parent 
education and support rather than punishment” has been highlighted.265 The Committee has 
reaffirmed the State Parties duty to assist parents in providing such living conditions which 
are necessary to the child’s development and to ensure that they receive protection and 
care.266 Unfortunately, Governments have been criticized to “forget this part” by prioritizing 
children without considering the role of parents.267 Within the CoE Member States, the 
above-described interpretation of Article 8 could thus promote and protect the rights of the 
child more effectively.  
4.3.2 Expert reports and opinions 
Where there is no imminent danger on the child’s physical well-being it seems that the Court 
considers more critically the quality, date, impartiality and amount of expert opinions and 
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recommendations in order to assess whether the domestic court’s decision was based on 
relevant and sufficient reasons. Expert reports and opinions for my purposes include reports 
by social workers, child psychiatrists, psychologists and doctors as well as other 
professionals from similar fields. 
In K. and T. v. Finland268, where two children were first taken into emergency care and 
subsequently into normal public care mostly due to their mother’s schizophrenia and 
psychoses, the ECtHR found that the normal care orders were not in violation of Article 8. 
The ECtHR explicitly stated that “in a situation in which, as detailed in the medical and 
social reports, the mother of the children was seriously mentally ill, there were social 
problems in the family and the prospects for the healthy development of the children in foster 
care appeared far more positive than the expected development in the care of their biological 
parents, the authorities could reasonably base the contested decisions on the assessment that 
was made of what was in the best interests of the children”.269  
In this case the Government demonstrated the mother’s mental illness and incapability to 
take care of the children and the necessity to take and keep the children in public care by 
multiple social welfare authorities’ reports, psychologist report on the older child, report by 
two doctors concerning the mother, statement by the children’s home, medical files and 
records of the mother and a psychiatrist report concerning the mother.270 All these reports 
were consistent in finding that at the relevant time the mother was incapable of taking care 
of the children but her mental state would not necessarily permanently prevent her from 
caring for them. The mother’s mental health was examined from time to time when she was 
hospitalized, and the reports also seem to provide an impartial overall view with notes such 
as “the mother’s behaviour was later found to be somewhat restless but not completely 
disorderly”.271 In addition to being up to date, the reports also describe the situation as a 
whole in detail. 
Noteworthy, however, is that reasons for finding the other applicant, the father of the new-
born baby, incapable of taking care of his child are not as detailed and as well understandable 
as in relation to the mother. The father’s paternity had been established on 13 July 1993, less 
than a month later than the child was placed in emergency care and two days prior the normal 
 
268 Application no. 25702/94 (12 July 2001).  
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care order. On 4 August 1993 the father was granted a joint custody of the baby with the 
mother. The social workers had stated that the father had taken good care of the baby at the 
hospital and later at the family centre were the baby was placed after the emergency care 
order. In addition, the family centre’s records provided that the father had succeeded in 
creating a relationship with the baby and learned to take good care of her. Nevertheless, 
when the domestic court decided to confirm the public care order of the new-born child in 
September 1993, it referred to conflicts between the applicants, the mother’s illness as a 
reason why neither of the applicants could take care of the child and unsuccessful results of 
care support as reasoning in its judgement. The father did not, however, appeal against this 
decision, only the mother did.272  
In 1995, pursuant to the applicants’ request for discontinue the public care of both children, 
the Social Board rejected the request and stated in relation to the father that according to a 
statement given by the children’s clinic, although he was capable of interaction with both 
children, he was considered to find it difficult to respond to the children’s emotional needs. 
In addition, the Board stated that both of the applicants’ abilities to act as educators taking 
care of the children’s needs were inadequate.273 However, altogether the assessment in 
relation to the father’s capabilities is not nearly as comprehensive as the mother’s. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR accepted as “reasonable, in the light of the evidence before the 
national authorities, their assessment that the father was not capable of coping with the 
mother’s mental illness, the expected baby of their own and the mother’s second child on 
his own”.274  
However, in relation to the matter discussed in the previous chapter, namely authorities’ 
obligation to consider supportive and preventive measures before splitting up family ties, it 
is a bit questionable why the father was considered as incapable of taking care of his first 
biological child with help from the authorities by the domestic court before any such 
measures actually had even been implemented. Especially, since prior to the care order made 
by the domestic court, the Social Welfare Board had already started to investigate whether 
the father could be entrusted with the responsibility for the child with the help of support 
measures taken by the Board based on the good relationship that had already developed 
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between them.275 The ECtHR did not however consider this issue separately but went on to 
say that the authorities could consider placement in public care was called for rather than 
continuation of the open-care measures or even introduction of new open-care measures.  
The relationship between the applicants’ which never ceased to continue and the national 
authorities’ perception of this relationship as a threat to the well-being and development of 
the child can be read between the lines from the facts of the case. At one point the father had 
told that he left the applicants’ mutual home after the social welfare authorities had told him 
that he had to “break off his relationship” with the mother “if he wanted to keep” the child.276 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR did not take a stand in relation to these issues while considering 
whether the national authorities had overstepped their margin of appreciation when deciding 
to take the children into public care. However, as part of the Court’s consideration relating 
to the alleged failure to take proper steps to reunite the family, the Court found that the 
national authorities had hindered the possibilities of reunification and on that regard the 
Court stated that it was striking how “exceptionally firm negative attitude” the authorities 
had.277 This case demonstrates well how the Court considers the circumstances of the case 
as a whole and why it is difficult to say precisely how much weight the ECtHR has attached 
to each of the factors it mentions.   
In R.M.S. v. Spain, where the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8, a social 
worker A.L.N. had given a report proposing that the visits of the mother should be 
suspended, and the child should be moved to a different children’s home. The report stated 
that the mother had an inappropriate, disrespectful, “violent” and aggressive attitude, she 
had attempted to harm herself and she had to be taken to hospital when her daughter was 
taken from her. Furthermore, according to the report, during three supervised visits the 
mother had encouraged her daughter to continue crying and shouting, she had accused the 
professionals of not providing her daughter with appropriate assistance and she had spoken 
with her daughter in a compulsive and incoherent manner. 278 
Subsequently, the same social worker had sent an e-mail almost two years later to the Red 
Cross, asking them to trace the applicant and check the situation with her fourth child who 
had been recently born. The social worker stated in the e-mail that the applicant’s two older 
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children where in foster care and the child concerned with the proceedings in the ECtHR 
had “been adopted” by a family who were also prepared to adopt the applicant’s baby.  
The ECtHR observed that the initial decision to place the approximately 4-year-old child in 
the children’s home was made based on the report by the social worker A.L.N. The 
subsequent decisions to withdraw the applicants contact rights and transfer the child to 
another home were made based on the same report. The Court observed that it is 
understandable that the social worker may have decided to take the child into care based on 
the urgency of the situation and the best interests of the child. However, the Court noted that 
following that decision, there should had been swiftly taken measures to examine in depth 
the child’s situation and her relationship with her parents. Furthermore, the Court was of the 
view that the authorities simply reproduced the successive decisions without making any 
new findings or assessing how the circumstances might have changed on the basis of tangible 
evidence. The Court pointed out that the judge had simply referred to “technical reports”, 
without giving any details as to their content, and found that it had not been proven that the 
mother was “once again competent to raise the child” although there were nothing to suggest 
that the applicant had ill-treated her daughter. Hence, it can be read indirectly from the 
judgement, that the expert reports relied upon by the domestic courts were not considered 
appropriate, relevant and up to date by the ECtHR. 
In Kutzner v. Germany, where the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8, the 
Court took into account that the domestic courts had failed to consider the expert reports as 
a whole. There had been no allegations that the children would have been neglected or ill-
treated by their parents. The Court pointed out that the reports given by two psychologists 
and which the domestic authorities relied upon were contradictory. One of the psychologists 
had referred to the parents’ lack of intellectual capacity and the other had stated that the 
emotional underdevelopment of the parents made them incapable of contributing to the 
development of the children’s personalities. In addition, the Court observed that the domestic 
courts had disregarded the opinions given by two other psychologists according to whom 
the children’s welfare was not in jeopardy and the parents were entirely fit to bring up their 
children, both emotionally and intellectually. They had also recommended as a less intrusive 
measure that the children should be given additional educational support.279 
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As was discussed in chapter 2, the CRC Committee has emphasized that when a decision 
concerning an individual child is made, the decision must be clear on how the best interests 
of the child were obtained. It would seem understandable that when a professional has been 
examined the situation and recommended some solution as in the best interests of the child, 
it would be more persuasive and convincing to consider that opinion to be in accordance 
with the child’s best interests.  
However, in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway and Sommerfeld v. Germany the Court 
observed that it would be going too far to say that domestic courts always required to involve 
a psychological expert on the issue of awarding contact, but that this depends on the 
circumstances of the case, having due regard to the age and maturity of the child 
concerned.280 Nevertheless, in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway, the ECtHR found that 
while generally it would be for the national authorities to decide whether expert reports were 
needed, in the instant case, the lack of fresh expert examination substantially limited the 
factual assessment of the mother’s new situation and her caring skills. Accordingly, this was 
partly the reason why the ECtHR found that the decision-making process was not conducted 
in a way to ensure that all views and interests were duly taken into account.281  
4.3.3 Procedural requirements 
The relevance of procedural requirements is well established especially in childcare 
proceedings and they become relevant in the assessment of the proportionality of the 
imposed measure and the application of the margin of appreciation. As a general rule, the 
decision-making process must be demonstrated to have included safeguards which are 
necessary to ensure the applicants’ participation and the adequate consideration of all 
relevant issues.282 According to the ECtHR, the Court must determine whether, having 
regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the serious nature of the decisions to 
be taken, the parents have been involved in the process “to a degree sufficient” to provide 
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them with the requisite protection of their interests.283 However, it seems that the Court has 
not yet developed procedural rights specifically for children284, although it has on some 
occasions pointed out the lack of the child’s involvement in the proceedings as will be 
discussed in chapter 4.7. 
In relation to the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8, I will only shortly point as 
an example the case of K. and T. v. Finland, where the Court considered that the national 
authorities did not violate Article 8 by not involving the parents in the decision-making 
process concerning emergency care orders. There the ECtHR has accepted that, when an 
emergency care order has to be made, it may not always be possible to associate in the 
decision-making process those who have custody of the child. Even if technically it would 
be possible, the Court recognized that it might not be desirable, if those having custody of 
the child are seen as the source of an immediate threat to the child. In this type of scenario, 
the prior warning could deprive the measure of its effectiveness. However, where no prior 
contact or consultation exists, the national authorities must demonstrate that they were 
entitled to consider that there existed circumstances justifying the abrupt removal.285 
The majority of the Court found that if the mother had been forewarned of the measure, it 
could most likely have had dangerous consequences for herself and for the children and that 
it was not a realistic option for the authorities to associate the second applicant either in the 
process due to the applicants’ close relationship and the likelihood of their sharing 
information.286 However, judge Mr G. Ress, joined by five other judges, disagreed that the 
emergency care order of the 12-year-old child was made in accordance with Article 8. In his 
view, there was nothing to imply that a normal decision-making process, which would had 
included the applicants, could not be have been possible in relation to him. He pointed out 
that the child was earlier placed voluntarily in the children’s home by the applicants and no 
drastic change had occurred which could have justified the emergency care order. According 
to him, a procedure by which the normal care order was prepared would have been 
reasonable and fully satisfactory one. 
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The next chapter’s focus is on the Court’s assessment in relation to the implementation of 
the care orders. These assessments include considerations relating to the amount and quality 
of contact between the natural family members once the children have been placed in public 
care. 
4.4 Implementation of care orders  
 
4.4.1 Right of access and contact between natural family members 
Although the case of Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1) was decided in 1988 and thus prior to the 
entry into force of the CRC, it demonstrates well the difficulties arising out of the 
implementation of care orders. In that case the Court accepted that the national authorities 
had acted in good faith in relation to the implementation of the decisions but by placing the 
three children with foster families in a great distance from their parents and from each other, 
the longest distance being 900 kilometres between the siblings, lead to a situation of 
impeding regular access and the implementation of the orders violated Article 8.287 
The case of Johansen v. Norway288 involved a child who had been taken into public care at 
the age of two weeks and her mother as the applicant. The applicant had already had her first 
child when she was 17 years old and due to cohabiting with a man who had mistreated her 
and the child, she was assisted by social welfare authorities in the upbringing of that child. 
In 1989, approximately two weeks before the child concerned was born, the mother’s first 
child was taken into public care at the age of 12 years old based on danger on his health and 
development.289 Subsequently, her daughter was also taken into public care a week after she 
was born and the applicant was allowed to see her twice a week at a Child Welfare Centre.290 
At the time of the initial order for public care, the social welfare authorities had 
recommended the relevant authority to refuse the applicant from having contact with her 
daughter and that the child’s new address should be kept as a secret. Ultimately, a care order 
was given according to which the child was taken into care, the mother was deprived of her 
parental responsibilities, the child was placed in a foster home with a view to adoption and 
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the applicant was refused access from the moment of the child’s placement in the foster 
home and the latter’s address was kept secret.291  
Two contradicting expert opinions were obtained before making the order. The psychologist, 
whose report was obtained by the relevant authority, concluded that the applicant was not 
capable of taking care of the child. The mother had requested a second expert which the 
child welfare authorities had refused to obtain. Hence, the mother herself engaged a 
psychologist who concluded that neither of the applicant’s children should be taken away, 
but the authorities should rather provide assistance and support.292 Nevertheless, the national 
authority concluded that it was in the interests of the child to be placed in a foster home with 
a view to adoption. The appellate instance subsequently decided not to give the mother’s 
appeal suspensive effect on the ground that it would be in the girl’s best interests if the 
decision to terminate access was implemented as from the moment when she was placed in 
foster home. As of the time when the ECtHR gave its judgement, the applicant’s daughter 
was still living with her foster family, but she had not yet been adopted.293 
The Government argued that the deprivation of access was in the child’s best interests 
because it was necessary to place the child in the foster home permanently. The Government 
stated that there was strong scientific evidence indicating that a placement was more likely 
to succeed if the child was adopted by the foster parents. According to the Government, 
reuniting the applicant with her daughter would had required extensive preparation 
presupposing good operation between all the parties involved and as the mother had shown 
extremely hostile attitude towards the child welfare authorities, there was a danger that she 
might disturb the daughter’s development in the foster home and try to abduct her if given 
access.294  
The ECtHR observed that the deprivation of the mother’s access to her child had a permanent 
character and it could only be considered “necessary” if supported by particularly strong 
reasons. The Court pointed out that the Government’s argument according to which the 
mother might disturb the calm and stable foster-home environment could not be decisive as 
the access arrangements could have been implemented outside the foster home. In addition, 
as the mother’s situation had improved from the situation she had with her first child and the 
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deprivation of access had irreversible effects, the measures could not be said to be justified 
albeit, the ECtHR stated that it had attached particular importance to the best interests of the 
child. Nevertheless, these particularly far-reaching measures should only be applied in 
exceptional circumstances if motivated by an overriding requirement to the child’s best 
interests.295  
The Court did consider relevant that “it was in the child’s interest to ensure that the process 
of establishing bonds with her foster parents was not disrupted”. The Court took into account 
that the girl who had already spent half a year with temporary carers before being placed in 
a long-term foster home, was at a stage of her development when it was crucial that she live 
under secure and emotionally stable conditions. In its consideration whether the reasons 
adduced by the Government were relevant, the Court also took into account that the mother 
was not “particularly motivated to accept treatment” and the authorities even feared that she 
might take her daughter away as on one occasion she had tried to disappear with her first 
child. According to the ECtHR, all these reasons were relevant but not sufficient.296  
The Court also took into account that the mother was granted access to the child twice a 
week when her daughter was living in the Child Welfare Centre and there was nothing to 
suggest that this had been detrimental to the child. Furthermore, the concerns of the 
Government were not of such a nature and degree that the national authorities could have 
been dispensed altogether from the obligation to take measures with a view to reuniting the 
natural family members. Furthermore, the Government had not shown that the measures 
corresponded to any overriding requirement in the child’s best interests.297  
This case illustrates well that the right to maintain contact between natural family members 
is strong and there must be particularly weighty reasons in relation to the best interests of 
the child to ban right of access altogether. It is noteworthy that the Court observed that there 
could have been other options available to provide access between the mother and the child 
than the foster home. Thus, the positive obligations under Article 8 in relation to contact 
rights might as well require providing meetings with the parties organized and secured by 
the national authorities and if measures of lesser degree still seem to be against the best 
interests of the child, the banning of access could be justified.  
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In K. and T. v. Finland two children were placed in a same foster home when the younger 
child was approximately seven months and the older five years old. The Social Welfare 
Board drew up a plan concerning the implementation of the public care according to which 
the father of the younger child was permitted to see his child once a month. The applicants 
requested an alternative plan, but neither they nor their representative attended the meeting 
organized by the authorities. Later on, the Social Director restricted both applicants’ access 
to the children to one monthly supervised visit at the foster home and subsequently on the 
premises of a school at the presence of one of the foster parents to last three hours for each 
visit. The County Administrative Court upheld the restriction after it took evidence, inter 
alia, from two psychiatrists who had interviewed the mother and from a child psychiatrist. 
According to the domestic court, allowing access once a month would ensure that the 
children retained knowledge about their biological parents and if later grounds for public 
care ceased to exist, a reunification of the family would be possible.298   
The applicants argued that the meetings with the children under strict supervision were so 
unnatural that they were never given a real opportunity to form normal family ties or have a 
normal family life. The Government had admitted during the Chamber proceedings that no 
measures aimed at reunification had been carried out but argued in the Grand Chamber that 
steps in order to terminate public care were taken.299 The ECtHR found that in relation to 
the obligation to take steps to reunite the natural family the national authorities violated 
Article 8 but that as regards to the situation at the time of the judgement the access 
restrictions were not in violation of Article 8.300 
In relation to the failure to take steps in order to reunite the family, the ECtHR stated that 
the attempts to guarantee that the applicants were able to bond with the children did not 
amount to a serious or sustained effort directed towards facilitating family reunification such 
as could reasonably be expected for the purposes of Article 8(2). This was especially due to 
the fact that these attempts constituted the sole effort on the authorities’ part to that effect 
during the seven years the children were in public care.301 With these attempts the Court 
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presumably referred to the obtained psychiatrists’ reports in 1995 which stated that neither 
of the applicants was able to understand and answer the needs of the children and especially 
the mother who suffered from mental illnesses was incapable of seeing the children as 
objects independent from her. The reports did not recommend anything about contact 
between the natural family members.302  
The ECtHR stated that the national authorities should had at least examined the situation 
anew from time to time to see whether there was any improvement in the family’s situation. 
The Court observed that the restrictions and prohibitions imposed on the applicants’ access 
to their children had rather contributed to hindering the possible reunification than preparing 
it. The Court further stated that what was striking in the case was the exceptionally negative 
attitude of the authorities.303 Here again the positive obligations to support the natural family 
with meetings in order to form and maintain close personal ties were regarded as to require 
more than what the national authorities had conducted. Although in this case the reports 
obtained by the national authorities stated that the open care measures and other support 
measures would not be enough in order for the applicants “to be responsible” for the 
children, it appears that the national authorities should had provided the family with more 
assistance in relation to bond with each other. Even though, the Government did admit that 
nothing was done in order to reunite the family it is noteworthy to point out that a mental 
illness of a parent as such might not be adequate to justify a lesser degree of measures taken 
in relation to the general positive obligations owed to the natural family by national 
authorities.  
In Kutzner v. Germany, the Court noted that the children, four and six years old, had been 
placed in separate, unidentified foster homes and all contact with their parents was severed 
for the first six months. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the natural parents were 
granted visiting rights only after making an application to the national court and visits were 
in practice systematically obstructed. The contacts were initially restricted to one hour a 
month in the presence of eight people who were not members of the family and afterwards 
increased to two hours a month with the grandparents being authorized to visit once every 
two months. The Court stated that taking into account that the children were very young, 
severing contact in that way and imposing such restrictions could only lead to the children’s 
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increased alienation from their parents and from each other. In this case the Court found that 
especially the way in which the care orders were implemented was unsatisfactory and 
violated Article 8.304 
4.4.2 Facilitating co-operation between parties concerned 
In some cases, the respondent Government seeks to justify the lack of measures taken in the 
view of reunification, restrictions on contacts or extraordinary implementation measures by 
hostile attitudes of the adult parties concerned or some other reasons the Government seeks 
to attribute to the parties concerned. 
The case of Hokkanen v. Finland provides a comprehensive example in special 
circumstances of the Court’s assessment concerning the difficulties in cooperation between 
the parties concerned.305 In this case, the applicant’s daughter was placed to live with her 
maternal grandparents by a private agreement after the child’s mother had passed away. 
When the child was two years old the grandparents informed the applicant that they did not 
intend to return the child back to him. National authorities attempted to achieve 
reconciliation between the applicant and grandparents but to no avail. In September 1991 
the grandparents were granted custody of the child on the grounds that it was in the child’s 
interests as she had already been living with them for six years. Prior to this decision the 
national authorities had ordered the grandparents to return the child to her father, most 
recently on 8 May 1991, but the grandparents had not obeyed they orders.306 
The right of access was stipulated by the same decision in September 1991. The applicant 
and his daughter were to meet for four hours one Saturday each month during the first three 
months at a place chosen by the national authorities and every other weekend between 
Saturday noon and Sunday noon. The child was also to spend two weeks of the following 
summer with the applicant and subsequently the holidays were supposed to be alternated 
between the applicant and the grandparents. However, the grandparents refused to bring the 
child to these meetings. The applicant sought to have his right of access enforced by the 
national authorities but to no avail and on 21 October 1993 the national appellate court 
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upheld the grandparents appeal and decided that in view of the child’s maturity, access could 
not be enforced against her wishes. The decision was based on a medical report according 
to which the child was physically and mentally healthy and a psychological test had shown 
that she was clearly of above average intelligence for a twelve-year-old. The report 
concluded that the child should not be forced to meet the applicant but rather to be allowed 
to decide for herself.307 
The ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 in relation to the period of time from the moment 
on when the ECHR entered into force in Finland until 21 October 1993 when the child was 
considered to be mature enough to decide about the access on herself. After that date, the 
Court found no violation.308 The Court observed that the difficulties in arranging access were 
in large due to the hostility between the grandparents and the applicant but that the Court 
“does not accept that responsibility for the failure of the relevant decisions or measures in 
actually bringing contacts can be attributed to the applicant”. The Court pointed out that the 
national authorities had observed the need for arranging meetings on a neutral ground. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the national authorities did not make reasonable 
efforts to facilitate reunion.309 
In relation to contact between a non-custodial parent and a child after divorce, the Court has 
recognized that the establishment of contact may require preparatory and phased measures 
where cooperation and understanding between all parties concerned is important. 310 
However, the Court stated in Ribić v. Croatia that lack of cooperation between separated 
parents does not exempt national authorities from their positive obligations under Article 8 
but rather imposes an obligation to take measures to reconcile the conflicting interests of the 
parties, keeping in mind the best interests of the child as primary consideration.311 Here the 
contacts between the applicant and his son were due to the mother’s lack of cooperation.312 
For example, in Glaser v. The UK the Court emphasized that even though national authorities 
must do “their utmost” to assist such cooperation, any coercion in this area is limited since 
the best interests of the child and his or her rights under Article 8 of the ECHR must be taken 
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into account.313  However, in the more recent judgement of Ribić v. Croatia, the Court 
pointed out that even though coercive measures against children are not desirable, the use of 
sanctions is not to be ruled out if the parent with whom the children live behaves in an 
unlawful manner.314 
Thus, although Article 8 does not explicitly oblige national authorities to facilitate 
cooperation with the parties concerned315 it seems clear that the authorities are not exempted 
from their responsibilities in relation to facilitating the natural family’s reunification by 
having difficulties in arranging contact and taking steps with the view to reunification due 
to hostile attitudes of the parties concerned. Whether this is to be interpreted as widening the 
scope of the positive obligations inherent in Article 8 to the extent that national authorities 
should take steps in order to improve the relationship between the parties concerned is not 
self-evident but nevertheless the authorities cannot justify failure to facilitate reunification 
based on the aforementioned reasons. However, since it has been regarded to never be in the 
child’s best interests if he or she is faced with torn loyalties316, all steps taken in relation to 
facilitating contact between the parties arguably are in the child’s best interests and would 
promote the rights of the child as well more efficiently.  
4.4.3 Changed circumstances 
The Court’s observations concerning whether national authorities have given due weight in 
relation to improved circumstances has been addressed to some extent in the previous 
chapters. The Commission noted already in 1984 that after a care order has been made, an 
updated assessment of the applicant’s abilities must be made at some stage, particularly 
when the order has not resulted from physical maltreatment but rather of psychological 
behaviour.317 
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In Johansen v. Norway, where the applicant’s daughter was taken into public care at the age 
of two weeks, the ECtHR stated somewhat “additionally” after already finding a violation 
of Article 8, that it should be noted that the national court had found already after less than 
a year had passed since the care order and decision concerning contact were made that the 
applicant’s “material conditions had improved to the point where she would have been able 
to provide her daughter with a satisfactory upbringing” but due to lack of contact between 
the applicant and her daughter, the Court could not terminate the care.318 
In K. and T. v. Finland, the Court emphasized, in relation to the national authorities’ failure 
to take proper steps to reunite the family, that the minimum to be expected of the authorities 
is to examine from time to time whether there are any improvements in the family’s 
situation.319 Also in R.M.S. v. Spain, the Court was of the view that the domestic authorities 
had not taken into account any subsequent events or changes in the mother’s circumstances 
when considering subsequent decisions relating to the alternative care of the child and they 
had made their decisions based on the initial report made by a social worker. The Court was 
unanimously of the opinion that the national authorities had not complied with their 
obligations under Article 8.320  
Based on the discussion above, Article 8 can be interpreted as requiring that national 
authorities review the care orders and contact restrictions from time to time and at least when 
one of the parties concerned initiate proceedings to that end. When reviewing the decisions, 
it understandable requires genuine assessment based on updated and relevant information 
and a similar balancing procedure which is required in the first place. The next chapters will 
discuss right of access concerning other relevant adults of the child’s family.  
4.5 Contact rights between a natural father and a child living with other legal 
parents 
In cases of Schneider v. Germany321 and Anayo v. Germany322, the Court has considered the 
right to respect for private and family life of a biological father whose child is living with 
the child’s mother and legal father. In Schneider the paternity of the child was not yet 
established by a DNA test but in Anayo it was known for a fact that the applicant was the 
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biological father of the twins. In both cases the applicants requested to have contact with 
their children who they never had cohabited with, but the legal parents refused it. Under 
domestic law, neither of the applicants had a right to have contact with their children in such 
a situation. What is significant about the reasoning of the ECtHR in relation to both of these 
cases is that it is heavily based on the domestic authorities’ failure to consider what would 
had been in the best interests of the children in question. The Court stated in both cases that 
consideration of what lies in the best interests of the child concerned is of paramount 
importance in every case of this kind and depending on their nature and seriousness, the 
child’s best interests may override those of the parents.323 
The unanimous finding of a violation of Article 8 in Schneider v. Germany was highly 
reasoned with the failure to give any consideration to the question, whether in the particular 
circumstances of the case, contact between the child and the applicant and information 
provided for the applicant concerning the development of the child would be in the child’s 
best interest. The Court stated not to be convinced that the best interests of the child can be 
determined by a general legal assumption and the actual fair balancing of the rights of all 
persons involved requires performing an examination of the particular circumstances of the 
case.324 The domestic courts failed to provide sufficient reasons to justify the interference in 
the applicant’s right under Article 8.  
In Anayo the Court similarly pointed out that the approach and interpretation of legal 
provisions by the domestic court led to a situation where the applicant was denied any 
contact with his children, irrespective whether such contact was beneficial for the children’s 
well-being. The Court further expressed the concern that “the legal parents’ motives for 
refusing contact did not necessarily have to be based on considerations relating to the 
children’s best interests”. The Court again unanimously found a violation of Article 8 based 
on the failure to adequately balance the interests of everyone concerned. This can be seen as 
a step forward to the right to have contact between both parents since traditionally the 
position of the unmarried father has been unfavourable in relation to his children based on 
allegedly protecting the child by refusing contact.325 
 
323 Schneider v. Germany, para. 93 and Anayo v. Germany, para.65.  
324 Schneider v. Germany, para. 100. 
325 See e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edition, Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd 1999), pp. 189–190. 
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However, as was pointed out in chapter 3, the biological link between the father and the 
child does not in itself lead to a situation where domestic authorities have positive 
obligations in relation to protect the father’s right to respect for private and family life. The 
Court took into account in both of the aforementioned cases the interest in and commitment 
by the father to the children concerned and whether it was demonstrated that the father had 
genuine interest in his offspring, which the father had succeeded to do in both of the cases. 
However, if the child’s right to contact with both parents is to be regarded as a general rule 
unless it is contrary to the child’s best interests and in a specific case the biological father is 
demonstrating his interest in the child at the latest by asking to have contact with him or her 
it could be argued that the child’s right to have contact with his or her biological parent 
should override the legal parents’ negative attitudes towards the biological father and the 
national authorities should at least examine whether granting contact would be in the child’s 
best interests.326   
Subsequently in similar circumstances the ECtHR found in Fröhlich v. Germany that the 
domestic had made the decision “in the child’s best interests” and it was satisfied that reasons 
for refusing to grant contact rights and provide the applicant with information about his child 
were relevant and sufficient.327 Here the domestic court had made a thorough analysis of the 
child’s integration in the family where she felt protected and secure. In addition, the domestic 
court demonstrated to be aware of the importance the question of paternity might have for 
the child in the future, when she would start to ask about her origin, but that in eny event at 
the time being, it was not in the best interest of the six-year-old child to be confronted with 
the paternity issue.328 
4.6 Contact rights with another adult family member and the child 
In Nazarenko v. Russia329 the applicant alleged, inter alia, that the termination of his parental 
status had deprived him of the right to have contact with his daughter or to lodge civil actions 
in defence of her rights. At the age of 4 years old, the child was ordered to live with her 
mother after her parents got divorced. Two years later, a DNA paternity test established that 
the applicant was not the child’s biological father and subsequently the domestic court 
 
326 Here again it would become important that the child participated in the assessment of what would be in his 
or her best interests either through a representative or by him or herself. For more about participation and 
the child’s best interests, see chapter 2.  
327 Application no. 16112/15 (26 July 2018), para. 66. 
328 See paras. 63–64. 
329 Application no. 39438/13 (16 July 2015). 
 75 
decided to, inter alia, terminate his parental status. The ECtHR found unanimously a 
violation of Article 8 based on the domestic authorities’ failure to provide a possibility for 
the family ties between the applicant and the child to be maintained. Particularly, the Court 
found a failure to respect the applicant’s family life based on the denial of contact rights 
without giving proper consideration to the child’s best interests.  
Here again, the Court reiterated that it was not convinced that the best interests of children 
in the sphere of contact rights can be truly determined by a general legal presumption. The 
Court stated that a fair balancing of the rights of all persons involved necessitates an 
examination of the particular circumstances of each case and accordingly, Article 8 of the 
ECHR can be interpreted as “imposing on Member States an obligation to examine on a 
case-by-case basis whether it is in the child’s best interests to maintain contact with a person, 
whether biologically related or not, who has taken care of him or her for a sufficiently long 
period of time”.330  In this case, four years of cohabiting with the child amounted to a 
sufficiently long period of time.  
In the circumstances of the case in question, the Government had failed to comply with the 
aforementioned obligation by denying the applicant the right to maintain contact with the 
child without any examination of the question whether such contact would be in the child’s 
best interests. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that there was nothing suggesting that 
contact between the applicant and the child would had been detrimental to the child, rather 
the opposite. The facts of the case included reports by the childcare authority and expert 
psychologists stating that there existed a strong mutual attachment between them and the 
applicant had been taking good care of her.331  Whether the Court would had found a 
violation of Article 8 if the Government had demonstrated that it was not in the child’s best 
interests to maintain contact with the applicant even though not explicitly considering them 
in the decision-making process is of relevance. Since the Court takes this literally into 
account by stating “furthermore” it can be argued that the lack of the explicit consideration 
of the child’s best interests amounted to a violation in itself. This interpretation would be in 
line with the obligations imposed by the CRC in relation to the national authorities’ duties 
to transparently find out what the best interests of the child are considered to be and on what 
grounds. 
 
330 Para. 66. 
331 Para. 67. 
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In Kopf and Liberda v. Austria332, a two-year-old child was placed in a foster family for 
approximately three years and ten months. In December 2001 the child was returned to his 
biological mother and the foster parents, the applicants in the ECtHR, requested contact 
rights without any delay. After approximately three years since the foster parents had 
requested contact rights, the domestic court refused the applicants from having contact with 
the child as it would not be in the child’s best interests and would put him in a situation of 
divided loyalties. The decision was based on, inter alia, two expert opinions stating that not 
granting visiting rights would not endanger the child’s well-being.333  
The ECtHR found that the domestic authorities succeeded to strike a fair balance between 
the competing interests in question. The Court pointed out that it was apparent from the 
domestic court’s decision that they examined whether contact between the foster parents and 
the child would be in the child’s best interests. Evidence presented to the domestic court had 
demonstrated that the child opposed meeting the foster parents and he had developed a close 
and positive relationship with his mother. The national court had acknowledged that the 
foster parents had a genuine concern for the child’s well-being, but their interests did not 
coincide with the child’s best interests. Since the child had not been in contact with the foster 
parents for three years, the court stated that it would follow the expert opinions 
recommending that the contact rights should not be granted. The domestic court observed 
that immediately after the child was taken away from the foster family granting visiting 
rights could have been useful. However, at the time of the judgement, that was no longer the 
case and would had not served the best interests of the child.  
However, although the Strasbourg Court found that the balancing exercise was performed 
adequately, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to non-compliance with the duty to 
deal the request for visiting rights diligently and thus, the procedural requirements implicit 
in Article 8 were not complied with. This will be discussed more in chapter 4.8. 
4.7 Participation, views and opinions of the child 
The participation rights of the child stipulated in the CRC have been considered to be a 
whole “new” category of children’s rights introduced by the CRC.334 It was established in 
 
332 Application no. 1598/06 (17 January 2012). 
333 Paras. 21–22 and 42. According to domestic legislation, a court had to take necessary measures if failure to 
provide for personal contact between the child and a third person would endanger his or her well-being. 
Third persons had no legal right to be granted contact rights. 
334 See e.g. John Wall, ‘Human Rights in Light of Childhood’ (2008) 16 Int’l J Child Rts 523. 
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chapter 2.2.4 that the concept of the best interests of the child require that Article 12 of the 
CRC, which enshrines the child’s right to be hear, is implemented and applied adequately. 
The Convention on Contact concerning Children also recognizes the child’s participation 
rights and according to Article 6, a child who is considered by internal law as having 
sufficient understanding shall have the right, unless this would be manifestly contrary to his 
or her best interests, to receive all relevant information, to be consulted and to express his or 
her views. Due weight shall be given to those views and to the ascertainable wishes and 
feelings of the child.  
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, the ECtHR usually examines the application 
from the parents’ perspective, and it is rare that a child would be a party to the proceedings 
as an applicant. Thus, the ECtHR was for a while never been in a situation where it needed 
to assess whether the child must be heard in the proceedings at national level in order to 
satisfy the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8 of the ECHR.335 In 2015 however, 
the Court found a violation of the child’s right under Article 8 due to national authorities’ 
failure to have her views heard. This case is discussed later in this chapter, but I will first 
discuss the previous case law of the Court in relation to this matter.  
In Hokkanen v. Finland the Court observed that the national authorities had not attached 
weight on the child’s own wishes not to see her father until in 1993. The reasons for not 
attaching weight to the views of the child were stated to be the low age of the child at that 
time (eight years old) and the fact that she had not been in a position to form her views 
independently. The domestic court observed that the grandparents had totally refused to co-
operate in the attempts to arrange meetings between the applicant and his daughter and the 
grandparents had a strong influence over the child.336 On the other hand, the domestic court 
had considered in October 1993 that the child was mature enough in order for her views to 
be taken into account and that access could not be enforced against her wishes. The ECtHR 
stated not to find any reason to call this finding into question.337 
In judicial literature, the judgment in Sahin v. Germany has been regarded as complying with 
the requirements set out in Article 12 of the CRC and that the assessment of the child’s best 
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interests was made properly.338 There the Strasbourg Court observed that the child who was 
three years old at the time when the proceedings concerning the father’s right of access begun 
had been spoken to by a psychological expert whose opinion about the child’s best interests 
was ultimately regarded decisive by the domestic court in denying access.339 The ECtHR 
found no violation of Article 8 and stated that it would be going too far to say that domestic 
courts are always required to hear a child in court “on the issue of access to a parent not 
having custody” but that it depends on the specific circumstances of the case and the age and 
maturity of the child must be taken into account.340 This case demonstrates well that the 
parents’, who had serious tensions between them341, had very different ideas about the 
child’s best interests and sought to achieve an outcome most suitable for themselves.  
In Sommerfeld v. Germany the ECtHR again found no violation in relation to a father’s right 
to respect for family life in a situation where the domestic court had refused the applicant’s 
right of access to his child based on the 13-year-old child’s clear wish not see his father. The 
child had made her opinion clear for several years and directly to the court.342 The domestic 
court had stated that forcing the girl to see her father would seriously disturb her emotional 
and psychological balance and thus it would not be in her best interests. The ECtHR found 
that the domestic decisions “can be taken to have been made in the interests of the child”.343 
However, the Court was not unanimous at this point in relation to whether the child had form 
her views “freely” as required by Article 12 of the CRC. The majority of the Court stated 
that the domestic courts cannot be held as obliged to always involve a psychological expert 
on the issue of access to a parent not having custody, yet again depending on the 
circumstances and the age and maturity of the child.344  In his partly dissenting opinion, 
joined by judges Pastor Ridruejo and Türmen, judge Ress disagreed and was of the opinion 
that the domestic court should assess the child’s best interest on the basis of a reasoned and 
up-to-date psychological report and the child should be heard by both the psychological 
expert and the court in order to guarantee that the procedural requirements of Article 8 are 
secured. 
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Contrary to these decisions, in C. v. Finland the Court found that the father’s right was 
violated mainly based on the domestic court’s failure to consider interests and factors other 
than those of the child in the decision-making process. This case has been envisaged as the 
case demonstrating that the ECtHR considers that hearing the views of the child is essential 
part of the process.345 The Court noted that “it is generally accepted that that courts must 
take into account the wishes of children in such proceedings” 346 and that at some stage it 
may become “pointless, if not counter-productive and harmful, to attempt to force a child to 
conform to a situation” which the child resists.347 Nevertheless, in the instant case, the 
domestic court had failed to hold an oral hearing and to take any steps to “clarify, through 
further evidence or expert opinion, any divergent interpretation of the evidence” or whether 
greater harm would be caused to the children by a decision in favour of the applicant. The 
Court noted that the domestic court had given the children “an unconditional veto power”.348 
In M. and M. v. Croatia the ECtHR decided to consider whether the domestic authorities 
had violated Article 8 of the ECHR by virtue of the jura novit curia principle.349 This case 
concerned highly dangerous deficiencies concerning the rights of the child in question and 
not public care and contact rights as such but I will draw attention to it since the reason why 
the Court decided to consider Article 8 was due to the authorities’ failure to take into account 
the views of the child. The Court stated to be “especially struck” by the fact that after four 
years and three months the child had not been heard in the proceedings and thus not given a 
chance to express her views on which parent she wanted to live with.350 The Court observed 
that forensic experts in psychology and psychiatry established that the child had expressed 
a strong wish to live with her mother. In addition, the Court took into account that ordering 
the child to live with her mother would not have meant that the child would had had to 
change school or otherwise be removed from her habitual social environment. Here the 
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ECtHR concluded that the child, who was an A-grade pupil and whom the experts viewed 
as being of good and even above-average intellectual capacities, was nine and a half years 
old at the start of the proceedings and over thirteen at the time of the judgement of the ECtHR 
and thus, it would be difficult to argue that, given her age and maturity, she would have not 
been capable of forming her own views and expressing them freely.351  Even if it was 
established that the child was traumatized by her parents through manipulation and 
emotional abuse.352 
In the aforementioned case the ECtHR found that the domestic authorities had violated the 
child’s right under Article 8 due to the fact that her wishes were not heard. This case again 
demonstrates the enormous opportunity of the ECtHR under Article 8 to guide the Member 
States’ interpretation and application of the concept of the best interest of the child in a way 
which more effective promotes and protects the rights of children. Article 8 could be 
interpreted in cases concerning children to requiring that the child’s views are heard in the 
proceedings by him or herself or through a representative.   
In addition, based on the review of the previous cases explained, it seems that in relation to 
the child’s views the Court is again more convinced about the domestic courts’ reasons, at 
least relating to the weight attached to the views, if there is an expert opinion supporting the 
reasons or some other “professional” has been involved in the case. Furthermore, it is clear 
from the case law that the domestic courts cannot rely merely on the opinions and views of 
the child without considering the interests of others and outcomes of other possible decisions 
as well.  
4.8 Issue of elapsed time 
The ECtHR has recognized that in proceedings concerning children, an important factor is 
that time takes on a particular significance since there is always a danger that any procedural 
delay will result in the de facto determination of the issue before the court.353 Due to the 
undisputed fact that children grow and evolve physically and emotionally, the decisions 
concerning their custody and contact rights are to be made quickly. 354  The Court has 
emphasized that there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the 
 
351 See para. 186. 
352 See paras. 9, 20, 69, 116, 139, 140, 168 and 183. 
353 See e.g. Glaser v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 32346/96 (19 September 2000), para. 66. 
354 William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (1st edition, OUP 2015), p. 
393. 
 81 
aforementioned risk. The Court has pointed out that this duty is decisive in assessing whether 
a case concerning access to children was heard within a reasonable time as required by 
Article 6 of the ECHR but that this requirement also forms part of the procedural 
requirements implicit in Article 8.355 
The length of family proceedings may be considered as part of the assessment of the 
proceedings as a whole under Article 8 but also under Article 6, according to which everyone 
is entitled to a fair trial and public hearing within a reasonable time. In its assessment, the 
Court takes into account, inter alia, the complexity of the proceedings as well as the conduct 
of the applicant and the relevant administrative and judicial authorities. The preparation of 
expert reports and other in-depth investigations along with involvement of several levels of 
jurisdiction might speak in favour of more lengthy proceedings. Where delays in the 
proceedings are attributable to the conduct of the applicant, the State won’t be held liable 
for the delays.356   
The CRC Committee has also pointed out that as children evolve, delays in or prolonged 
decision-making have particularly undesirable effects on children. A fundamental difference 
is that the passage of time is perceived differently by children compared to adults.357 In the 
OPCP, discussed in chapter 2, the duty to consider the issues speedily has been taken into 
account in Articles 8(2), 10, 11, 13 and 14. According to Article 10(1), the Committee shall 
consider communications “as quickly as possible”. 
The case of Kopf and Liberda v. Austria serves as an unfortunately good example of the 
effect of the passage of time. The foster parents who had lived with the child for 
approximately three years and ten months requested visiting and contact rights after the child 
was placed back with his biological mother. The domestic court made its first decision 
concerning the foster parents’ request after almost three years had passed since the request 
was initiated. The ECtHR found unanimously that the procedural requirements implicit in 
Article 8 were not complied with. The ECtHR noted to be true that the case was of some 
complexity and the applications filed by the foster parents during the proceedings might had 
contributed to the length, but that this was not sufficient to explain the total length of the 
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domestic proceedings during which time the foster parents had no contact with the child. 
The Court stated that the passage of time had a direct and adverse impact on the foster 
parents’ position since it was apparent from the domestic court’s decision that the elapsed 
time was crucial for it when deciding not to give contact rights to the foster parents.358 
Secondly, the issue of time might come into consideration when reuniting the natural family 
members. The ECtHR has acknowledged that when a “considerable period of time” has 
passed since the child was originally taken into public care the interest of the child not to 
have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the 
parents to have their family reunited.359 Obviously in this type of situation the elapsed time 
renders the family’s right to reunification impossible altogether. In Ribić v. Croatia the Court 
pointed out that the applicant had seen his son only three times during the child’s entire 
childhood partially due to the delays in custody and contact proceedings and that such a 
lengthy period is a priori in breach of the State’s obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Court emphasized that the relations between a parent and a child are to be determined 
solely in the light of all relevant considerations and not by the passage of time.360  
Furthermore, in cases concerning right of access by a parent not living with the child, the 
Court has stated that the adequacy of the measures taken by domestic authorities are to be 
judged by the swiftness of their implementation due to the fact that time can have 
“irremediable consequences” for the relationship between the child and the parent 
concerned.361 In Shvets v. Ukraine, the Court found that the applicant’s, who was the paternal 
grandfather of the child, right to respect for family life was violated mostly based on the 
failure by the domestic authorities to enforce the applicant’s legally granted right to maintain 
contact with the child and the failure to show requisite diligence in treating the applicant’s 
case. The proceedings had lasted almost three years.362 
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5 FINAL REMARKS 
 
The research demonstrated that the European Court of Human Rights has taken the concept 
of the best interests of the child into account in every case that was under more detailed 
examination. Thus, the concept is already firmly interpreted as forming part of the child’s 
right under Article 8 of the ECHR. However, during the research I found it confusing how 
the Court actually formulates the concept of the best interests of the child somewhat 
irregularly. In some instances, the Court emphasizes that the best interests of the child are of 
paramount importance and on other that the best interests of the child are of crucial 
importance. There is a difference between saying that the best interests of the child are a 
primary consideration than to say that they are of paramount importance since the latter 
seems to be going further than Article 3(1) of the CRC.363 
For instance, in the discussed case of R.M.S. v. Spain, the Court explicitly noted that the 
interests of the child and those of the mother are often difficult to reconcile and in the pursuit 
of a balance between these different interests, the child’s best interests must always be a 
paramount consideration.364  It can be argued to be more difficult to draw any general 
principles and guidance when the “obligation” relating to the balancing of different interests 
might vary from case to case. Hence, the use of different formulations of the concept of the 
best interests of the child, especially when the Court has explicitly referred to Article 3(1) 
of the CRC in its list of relevant sources of international law, might be one of the causes 
surrounding difficulties in knowing how much weight is to be attached to the interests of the 
child and to other interests.  
In relation to the criticism the ECtHR has faced concerning the failure to give clear guidance 
as to how much weight is to be attached to each factor considered in the balancing process, 
I consider that it might be practically impossible to provide exact guidance to that end. The 
CRC Committee has also emphasized that the concept of the best interests of the child is a 
dynamic one and it should be applied in each specific case in a way which guarantees that 
the individual’s interests are assessed adequately. The fact that the CRC does not impose 
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any fixed factors supports the approach to consider the circumstances as a whole, taking into 
account all factors which might affect what is to be considered in the child’s best interests. 
The ECtHR has emphasized this approach of considering the case as a whole in the examined 
cases.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued in relation to the balancing process that the national authorities 
should at least explicitly consider the best interests of the child as well as other members of 
the family. This is evident in the cases of Schneider v. Germany and Anayo v. Germany but 
analogically also from the Court’s statements pointing out that the national authorities must 
“conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of 
factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and 
make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person”.  
Furthermore, it would seem that if there are up-to-date expert reports from professionals who 
have familiarized with the family’s situation and examined the child’s best interests, and 
which transparently and with reasoning suggest or recommend some solution to be in the 
child’s best interests or otherwise provide detailed description about the family’s situation, 
the Court is more convinced to find that the balancing process was made adequately. In more 
ambiguous cases, the Court also considers in more detail how much weight national 
authorities have attached to the opinions and recommendations. This in turn could lead to a 
finding of a violation in cases where some less intrusive measures have been suggested to 
be adequate enough by a professional but where none have been attempted by the national 
authorities. 
Also in general, the positive obligations of Article 8 might be interpreted to require that the 
national authorities must at least consider some less intrusive measures and accordingly at 
least attempt to assist the family before they make a care order or restrictions on contact 
rights where they cannot provide relevant and sufficient reasons in the interests of the child 
for making such decisions immediately. If not yet interpreted as an obligation, the Court 
clearly seems to attach weight to this factor in deciding whether States have overstepped 
their margin of appreciation.  
Finally, I will also point out the Court’s considerations relating to the questions concerning 
child’s participation. The adequate balancing process might require in the future that the 
child is involved in the proceedings affecting him or her which would be in accordance with 
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the CRC. This could happen either by hearing the child directly or by appointing a special 
representative of the child to make sure that the child’s voice and interests are not overlooked 
in the proceedings which ultimately has direct impacts on the child. During the proceedings 
where the adult parties concerned have their own ideas of the child’s best interest and whose 
relations can be severely strained the child easily ends up in the middle of fighting adults 
without anyone genially interested in his or her best interests. The CRC Committee has 
accordingly emphasized that “if the interests of children are not highlighted, they tend to be 
overlooked”.365  The ECtHR has a great potential in the realization of this right and based 





365 General Comment No. 14 (2013), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14, para. 37. 
